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
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L. Phil. Anderson

# THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR ON LAND.

A Brief Account of the Strategy and Major  
Tactics of the War.



BY  
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## PREFACE.


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I believe I am justified in stating that up to the present no complete military account of the Russo-Japanese War, of 1904-05, has been published in English. In the following very brief account I have endeavoured to set forth the actual happenings with particular emphasis on the general trend of the criticisms of the strategy and major tactics of both sides as voiced by Continental opinion.

The opinions expressed in this short work are either generally admitted, or else taken from well-known military writers, both British and Foreign, and in particular from the writings of Major Löffler, of the Royal Saxon General Staff, and General Negrier, of the French General Staff. The whole War is pregnant with instruction for us, for it was a contest between a Maritime Power (or at any rate, a Power that obtained complete control of the Sea for the purposes of the War) and a great Continental Power of the "nation in arms type." That the former would have gained the day had its Army been in an unprepared condition is impossible. The victory fell to Japan, because both Navy and Army were ready; it is to be hoped that the moral will not be lost upon the British public.

F. R. SEDGWICK.

*United Service Club,  
14th August, 1906.*



## CHAPTER I.

### THE POSITION BEFORE THE WAR.

JAPAN emerged from a sleep of centuries in the middle sixties, and took from that time the shape of a modern Power. She created a navy trained by British Officers, and an army trained by French and Germans, and tested this newly acquired military strength in a war with China, whose ill-disciplined levies and ill-found battleships she disposed of without difficulty.

For centuries Russia has been slowly and surely extending her dominions across Asia, and the progress had been very rapid in the last fifty years of the nineteenth century. Except on the South, Russia had become the nearest neighbour of the Chinese Empire, and not unnaturally exercised great influence in Peking.

After the Chino-Japanese War, it was Russia and Germany that prevented Japan from reaping the full fruits of her victory, and by the Treaty of Simonoseki, Port Arthur, a naval base of China, captured by Japan, was ceded back to China.

It was not long after this that Russia leased Port Arthur herself, and constructed a railway from thence through Manchuria to join her trans-continental system. To guard this railway, troops were placed on the line, consisting not only of railway guards,

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but also of field troops. Russia also completed her trans-continental railway, and thus became a more and more important factor in the Far East.

The Government of the Czar was, it is true, under pledge to evacuate Manchuria, but the time to do so seemed to be far away, and meanwhile the Russians were pressing upon Korea from the north, and their activities seemed to clearly foreshadow the absorption of this country also—a country that had seemed destined to find employment for the surplus Japanese population, and is also placed in such a position as to be strategically of vital importance to Japan.

There is no doubt that the whole of the Japanese people fully realised that a war, sooner or later, with Russia was inevitable; every book about Japan, and there are hundreds of them, referred to this event as inevitable in the near future.

It seems probable, on the other hand, that the Russian diplomatists in St. Petersburg never really believed that the Japanese would dare to assail them, so overwhelming appeared the strength of Russia.

A glance at the map will show that Japan was justified in fearing the Russian menace.

Korea juts out towards Japan like a dagger held towards her heart, should it be held by an enemy.

At the first blush, the forces on either side appeared to be impossibly unequal.

On sea it is true that Japan had a small superiority of strength in the Pacific, but Russia had a great

naval force, sufficient to put the balance far over to her side, in European waters. On land, Japan had increased her forces after the Chinese War to thirteen Active Divisions, two Cavalry, and two Field Artillery Brigades, thirteen Reserve Brigades, and a Home defence force of about 100 battalions.

The strength is given in more detail in the appendix. Russia's Army is counted in millions, and her Army Corps by the score.

In resources too, Japan seemed equally out-matched, for the vast wealth of the Russian Empire should stand almost any drain that could conceivably be put upon it, while Japan is a poor country. But looked at more closely, it is at once seen that the forces were not so disproportionate as appeared at first sight.

Russia's actual force east of Lake Baikal in the early part of 1904 consisted only of, Active Troops, ninety-two battalions, thirty-five squadrons, and 248 guns and reserve troops, thirty-two battalions and seventeen batteries, the permanent troops of the fortresses at Vladivostok, Possiet Bay and Port Arthur, and about 30,000 Railway and Boundary Guards, which would expand to about 42,000 to 45,000 on mobilisation.

This force was scattered over Manchuria and Southern Ursari.

To mobilise it would take a long time, and to reinforce it to a strength commensurate with the Japanese Army would take months, for the

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reinforcements must come chiefly from Russia over a single line of rail 4,000 miles long, and that broken at Lake Baikal.

At sea, too, the Russian reinforcements must come from Europe, and the Japanese might well hope to cripple the Pacific Squadron before ever these reinforcements arrived.

The Japanese were more fortunately placed. Their superiority of naval force would enable them to secure the passage of transports to the mainland, and it was reasonably calculated that in six weeks from the outbreak of war, a force sufficient to cope with the Russians immediately on the spot could be landed in Southern Manchuria, and that this force could be reinforced far quicker than the Russian.

Everything then turned on sea-power; without it Japan could stir neither hand nor foot, and though even were Japan beaten at sea, Russia could not land an army in Japan with any hope of doing any good, yet the loss of sea control would mean to Japan her inevitable defeat. Russia, however, was territorially inviolable. Of marching to Moscow there could be no idea. Even Port Arthur was not her own, and Manchuria she was under pledge to evacuate. The Japanese objective then must be the Russian Army, and as this army depended on the railway, certain important stations would become the temporary strategical objects. The capture of Port Arthur and the re-capture of Sakhalin, taken from Japan many years before, and possibly an

attack on Vladivostok, would also be strategical points of importance. The naval bases would be peculiarly important, as they would shelter the inferior Pacific Squadron until the arrival of the Russian naval reinforcements.

Of the Theatre of War (Command of the Sea held by the Japanese) there could be no doubt. It must be Manchuria and Northern Korea. Southern and Eastern Manchuria and Northern Korea are mountainous countries, while Northern and Western Manchuria is a wide fertile plain. The map at the end of the chapter shows the main strategical points and lines of railway—of roads, except the main road that runs near the railway, there are none.

The climate is very healthy, but bitterly cold in winter, when the ports of Manchuria are ice-bound. The country yields a considerable quantity of food and forage as soon as the great plain is reached; the mountainous part is, however, bare and inhospitable.

Such, then, briefly, was the position of the two sides before the outbreak of War, and it may be interesting to note the preparations for the conflict made on either side.

The Russian plan of campaign was based on the assumption that the Japanese were landed in Southern Manchuria, and in view of their superior local force contemplated a concentration about Mukden and further north. Port Arthur was to



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
be defended to retard the Japanese force, and to shelter the fleet, which would thus be placed in an invaluable strategical situation on the flank of the line of Japanese Sea Communications, and six Army Corps, four Siberian and two European, with two Cavalry Divisions, besides Lines of Communication troops, were to form the Field Army. The Japanese calculated on a naval success sufficiently decisive to enable them to land troops on the mainland with impunity, and their strategical plans show clearly in the working of events.

Strategically, it would seem that delay was everything to the Russians, speed everything to the Japanese.

Of the men on each side much has been written. The Russian peasant is, as a fighting man, well known to every European Army. In centuries of warfare he has shown himself hardy, resolute, and of extraordinary tenacity; neither fatigue nor danger seems to severely shake his morale. On the other hand, he is slow and unintelligent, and shrewd observers had declared that neither the officers nor men of the Russian Army were trained to the pitch that modern soldiers must acquire. The bayonet cult was still worshipped in the Russian Army, and still on active service the soldiers marched and fought with bayonets fixed. The cult of the bayonet had been allowed to override the careful musketry instruction of the men. The little Japanese soldier, on the other hand, an average of eight inches shorter



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## THE POSITION BEFORE THE WAR. 7

than his opponent, was a partially unknown quantity. But here again shrewd observers had already noted that keenness, intelligence and high training were as marked in the Japanese Service as their absence was marked in that of Russia. General Sir Ian Hamilton noticed this at once, and even prophesied the issue before the event, so impressed was he by the appearance of the Japanese.

Their organisation, too, was known to be perfect, and the transport and medical arrangements most carefully considered.

Both armies were armed with modern rifles, and Russia was in the process of re-arming her artillery with Q.F. long recoil Field Guns. The Japanese had an improved breech-loading weapon converted to Q.F., but not quite up-to-date.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE OUTBREAK OF WAR AND THE FIRST MOVEMENTS.

WAR arrived perhaps somewhat more suddenly than had been expected, for it was not believed that Japan would readily break off negotiations with her great neighbour.

On February 5th the Russian Ambassador received his papers from the Japanese Foreign Office, and on the 8th War actually broke out by an action between a Squadron of Japanese cruisers covering troop transports, and a Russian cruiser in Chemulpo Harbour, which endeavoured to molest the landing of an advanced guard of Japanese troops. On the night of the 8th-9th, and on the 9th February, the Japanese Fleet under Admiral Togo inflicted most serious injuries on the Russian Squadron at Port Arthur, and forced them to take refuge under the guns of the fortress.

The Japanese now proceeded to land troops at Chemulpo and occupied Seoul. The troops thus landed consisted of the 2nd, 12th, and Guards Divisions, under the command of General Kuroki, and were designated the 1st Army, and numbered in all about 45,000 men, including Cavalry.

The march northwards was commenced at once, but was found to be an exceedingly difficult operation.

No opposition could be offered by the Russians, whose advanced posts of cavalry were at most sixty miles south of the Yalu, but the country did not contain a road and supplies were almost unprocureable.

The Force had to march therefore by staging. Covering troops, consisting of mixed detachments of Cavalry and Infantry pushed on ahead, and then supplies were forwarded and the troops brought up to the supplies. Each Division marched in two stages, and there were two days' interval between the leading and second Divisions; three days between the second and rear Divisions.

In this way it was only by the middle of March that Anju was reached, and not till the 4th of April that the force were collected in close touch with the enemy. As the ice permitted, harbours further north were occupied and supplies landed, but even this assisted the actual advance but little, though it shortened the line of supply when the Army at last stood concentrated in touch with the enemy.

On the Russian side there had been no idleness, and grass did not grow on the Siberian railway. Mobilisation was slow on account of the immense distances, but it was pushed on fairly satisfactorily. With the greatest energy between the 10th and 29th February, a line was laid over the ice on Lake Baikal and 2,000 waggons sent over to minimise the shortage of rolling stock in the far sections, while all along the line more sidings were constructed so that nine trains a day could be run each way.

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In spite of difficulties a line was completed round Lake Baikal, under the personal supervision of Prince Chikoff, Minister for Communications, by the 25th September; meanwhile troops marched round, after the ice gave, and supplies were shipped across.

The performances of this railway during the war were most remarkable. According to Löffler, up to the end of 1904, 410,000 men, 93,000 horses, and about 1,000 guns with transport, trains, ammunition, clothing, etc., besides about 100,000 non-combatant service men and women were forwarded over the 4,500 miles from European Russia to Mukden.

As has been previously stated, the original plan of Campaign on the Russian side had been to concentrate a force of six Army Corps and two Cavalry Divisions north of Mukden and await the Japanese advance. It was calculated that nearly six months would be required to collect this force.

The Russian forces were originally split into two groups, in South Ussuri, I. Siberian Army Corps, and in Southern Manchuria, headquarters Mukden, II. and III. Siberian Army Corps.

Besides these were the permanent garrisons of the Naval Stations, the railway troops, and the garrison of the Island of Sakhalin.

Admiral Alexieff, the Viceroy, was also Commander-in-Chief, and General Linievitch, a fine old soldier, veteran of every war since the Crimea, commanded the troops in Manchuria.



As has been pointed out, the Russian strategy had to be based on the fact that several months were required for mobilisation, that is to say, that decisive fighting *must* be avoided, and time *must* be gained.

The Russian advanced troops from the Manchurian Army were on the Yalu, and at first consisted of a Brigade of Cossacks under Mistchenko, and a Division of Infantry (not up to strength) under Kastalinski. The Russians, it may be observed parenthetically, have been much blamed by certain Continental strategists for not having had more troops ready for eventualities in Manchuria. Seeing, however, that the Russians were under pledge to evacuate Manchuria, to have sent more than two Army Corps, over and above the railway guards, into Southern Manchuria would be stretching a point further than even Muscovite diplomacy could respectably go.

On March the 27th Kuropatkin arrived from Russia to take over military command in the Far East, subject, in general, to the direction of the Viceroy. He found that the component parts of his Army had been much dispersed. Large numbers of the original Siberian 1st Army Corps which had been quartered in Southern Ussuri had been sent to reinforce Port Arthur, and with them a portion of the 3rd Corps. More troops had been sent to the Yalu, and the assembling of his Army thereby made more difficult.

There seems to be no doubt that it was Alexieff who was responsible for this state of affairs; it was

he who increased the force on the Yalu, detached hundreds of miles from its base (the railway from Harbin to Port Arthur), and he who assisted in making confusion worse confounded by sending odd units here and odd units there, until the assembling of the force in groups having proper cohesion appeared an almost impossible task.

Further, it was Alexieff who insisted in shutting up a large force of Field troops inside Port Arthur.

The garrison of Port Arthur appears to have been brought up to 40,000 men, including Volunteers, and immense quantities of supplies of all kinds were forwarded to the fortress, which was placed under command of General Stoessel.

Information as to the movements of troops leaked out too into the Far Eastern papers; thus, 25th February, one Siberian Artillery Brigade from the 1st Siberian Army Corps was noted as having moved from Nikolsk to Liauyang, and so forth, information which must have helped the Japanese intelligence department.

Finally the troops became distributed about Mukden and Liauyang, at which latter place Kuropatkin established his headquarters. Apart from the separate force in Port Arthur, Vladivostok had its permanent garrison, and there remained in Southern Ussuri only the 8th and part of the 2nd Siberian Rifle Divisions with a few sotnias of Boundary Cossacks. The force on the Yalu under General Zasulich consisted of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division and the 6th East

Siberian Reserve Division, with a Brigade of Cossacks under Mistchenko. On the coast near Niuchwang was the 9th Siberian Reserve Division.

To sum up, Kuropatkin succeeded in collecting towards the end of April in and about Liauyang and southwards:—

5th East Siberian Rifle Division (II. Siberian Corps).

1st East Siberian Rifle Division (I. Siberian Corps).

One Brigade 31st Infantry Division (X. Army Corps).

One Brigade 35th Infantry Division (XVII. Army Corps).

1st Siberian Infantry Reserve Division.

The first portion of the IV. Siberian Corps, i.e., 2nd and 3rd Siberian Infantry Reserve Divisions. This Corps was complete by the end of May.

The Trans-Baikal Cossack Division.

The Siberian Cossack Division.

These troops arrived partly by route-march.

Total, excluding Port Arthur and South Ussuri, end of April, 100,000 ; end of May, 140,000.

About the 20th May the X. and XVII. European Army Corps had completed their mobilisation in Europe, and the I. European Army Corps had commenced mobilisation, and by the beginning of September a further 100,000 men, with very strong Artillery, had arrived for the Main Army, most of whom took part in the Battle of Liauyang.

The pushing forward of troops towards the threatened points was certainly correct if it was intended to gain touch and gain time, but not to fight decisive actions.

The Japanese had pushed out a company to seize Ping Yang, which was occupied on the 21st February, and on the 28th a patrol affair, which was the first encounter of the campaign, took place here. A Cossack patrol was repulsed.

The Japanese mixed patrols were constantly engaged with the Cossacks after this, and on the 25th March a more serious affair took place at Senju, where a detachment of Japanese cavalry, with infantry supports, was attacked by five sotnias of Cossacks. The Cossacks were repulsed.

By the 4th April Kuroki had at last collected the whole of his force at Anju, within about three or four marches of Wiju, with detachments already on the Yalu. Only one road, however, was available, for the others were impassable.

Meanwhile, the left flank was secured by mixed detachments, and the advanced guard of the Guards' Corps pushed forward further north. Supplies were also landed at various points on the coast.

The constant difficulties of the march only allowed the concentration of the Army at Wiju on the 20th April.

The Russian position behind the Yalu was naturally one of immense strength, and lay along steep and rugged hills, protected in front by the unfordable river.

The position was cut in half by the Aiho River, and in the junction between the Aiho and the Yalu were the mountains known as Tiger Hill.

General Zasulich had for the defence two divisions of infantry and Mistchenko's brigade of Trans-Baikal Cossacks. To Kastalinshi, with the 3rd Siberian Rifle Division, was entrusted the left, and Zasulich's own Division, the 6th Siberian Reserve, took the right, and were largely at Antung, and still lower down the river.

It appears that opposite Wiju for the actual battle no more than 10,000 men and forty-eight guns, with eight machine guns, were collected to prevent the passage of Kuroki's Army of three strong Divisions.

The ground about Chiulengcheng was carefully entrenched, but no entrenchments of importance were made on Tiger Hill.

From now on until the 25th, time was spent by the Japanese in reconnoitring, and on the night of the 25th-26th the Guards seized Kyurito. In consequence of this, the Russians withdrew from Tiger Hill to the right bank of the Aiho River.

The main channel of the Yalu was now reconnoitred, and a bridge thrown to Kinteito, the making of which the Russians endeavoured to hinder by shell fire from the hills above Laotuntsu; it was, however, completed by the 27th. A second bridge to Kinteito was completed in the night of the 27th-28th.

Bridges were built over the small stream above Wiju and to Kyurito (*vide* Sketch).


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On the 25th and 26th and subsequent days the Japanese gunboats were very active in the estuary below Antung, probably with a view to attracting the enemy's attention to his right, while the arrival of junks laden with bridging material further heightened the illusion of the Russian headquarters.

Everything being now ready, on the 28th orders were issued for the 12th Division, which was equipped with mountain artillery, to bridge across the river at Suikauchin on the 29th, and clear the left bank of the Aiho River, while the main attack was to be delivered on the 30th.

The bridge at Suikauchin was completed by the morning of the 30th, and the Division crossed.

During the fighting on the 29th, a company of the Guards in Kyurito were severely handled, and the Russians re-occupied Tiger Hill.



On the morning of the 30th, the Russian guns opened fire on some Engineers engaged in sounding in the river, and instantly the whole of the Japanese Artillery, seventy-two field guns and twenty heavy howitzers, opened fire from their carefully prepared position on the batteries above Chiulengcheng, and within an hour the Russian Artillery was silenced. Meanwhile, the 12th Division was making its appearance felt, and the Russians again retreated to the right bank of the Aiho River.

Now was the time for the Russians to retire. Quite outnumbered, and far from their base, a retreat was no disgrace, a defeat would be disastrous, and a victory of little practical value, for it could not be decisive. Zasulich, however, decided to stay and fight it out.

At 7 a.m. on the morning of the 31st, the Japanese Infantry advanced for the attack, in a long line reaching from Chukodai to Sandowan. Some guns above Makan opened fire, but were silenced by the Guards' Artillery at Kyurito, and it was not until the Aiho was reached, that the infantry was fired at from the trenches. Then a storm of lead burst upon them, but though staggered for the moment, they rallied and pushed on, and by 9 a.m. the trenches were occupied.

Apparently, the attack was not pushed further at once, and it was only on the arrival of the reserves that a further advance on the heights above Chiulengcheng was made, and these were occupied about noon.

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Meanwhile, the right of the 12th Division was still moving forward, and about 2 p.m. the 5th company of the 24th Regiment engaged the Russian rearguard at Hamatan.

It is time now to turn to the Russian side. As has been pointed out, Zasulich had retained the bulk of his cavalry and a brigade of infantry at Antung; thus instead of employing the whole of his already weak two Divisions in the fight, he had only one-and-a-half; in all about 12,000 men engaged. Kastalinski had held out as long as possible, and about 1 p.m. Zasulich ordered the two battalions of the 11th Regiment, and the 3rd Battery 3rd Brigade to cover the retreat of the troops from Antung. These troops took up a position at Hamatan, and it was against them that the adventurous 5th Company 24th Regiment had struck.

The gallant Japanese succeeded in holding this rearguard to its ground, while it was surrounded by two regiments of the Guards, one of the 12th, and one of the 2nd Division, driven into a hollow, and after a most gallant resistance, some few men succeeded in cutting their way out with the bayonet, and the remainder surrendered with six guns and eight machine guns. The pursuit was only pushed by the infantry. Particularly interesting in this engagement is the part played by the gunboats in holding the Russians to their ground at Antung, while the army crossed the river.



The greatest care was taken throughout by the Japanese to conceal their movements, and every precaution was most carefully thought out and acted upon.

As an instance, it may be mentioned that to enable the guns to pass from their camp to their position unnoticed, a large number of trees were cut down and planted along the slope of the hills, along the face of which the guns must pass, in order to hide their movements from view. This was done at night, and the slight change in the landscape passed unnoticed next day.

The Russian loss was approximately 2,400 dead and wounded, and 1,300 prisoners.

The Japanese 889 killed and wounded.

Thus the first pitched battle of the war had been fought and won, and the influence on the Japanese morale must have been incalculable.

There can be no doubt that the success was partly due to the caution which characterised the Japanese movements, and left nothing to chance. At the same time Kuroki, with 45,000 men, was held inactive for several days (20th to 31st) by a force less than half his strength, so it would appear that caution was carried too far. Löffler's criticism on the tactics of the Russians is undoubtedly sound. "That it was right to hold the line of the Yalu is undoubtedly true, for time was everything, and the river a most formidable obstacle. It was tactically not strategically that the Russians were at fault, for they might

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have used the river as Napoleon did the Rhine after the Battle of Leipsie for a feint defence; and after the position was turned, they should have retired, and not risked an engagement with superior forces.

“Lastly, if they intended to fight at Chiulengcheng, Zasulich should have held his reserve at hand, and not at Antung.”

### CHAPTER III.

#### OPERATIONS UP TO MID-JUNE, INCLUDING THE BATTLES OF NANSHAN AND TEHLISSU.

THE 1st, 3rd, and 4th Divisions under Oku, and the 9th and 11th Divisions, under Nogi, had been waiting in Chinampo Harbour the result of the battle of the Yalu, and on the 5th May Oku's force commenced disembarking at a point on the Liaotung peninsula, opposite Elliott Island, while Nogi landed about Pitzewo.

The next trip of his transports brought Oku a cavalry and a Field Artillery Brigade.

On the 16th April a naval engagement had practically placed the Russian fleet *hors de combat*, and numerous attempts had been made by the Japanese to seal Port Arthur harbour by sinking ships in the fair way. An attempt on May 3rd was reported as successful, but it since appears that this was only partially the case.

Oku at once placed his army in motion and his advanced troops cut the railway on May 6th, while a few days later the railway was more effectually destroyed and Port Arthur was at last beleaguered.

The Russians had used the three months' grace to good purpose, and about 40,000 men, including a strong mobile force, was assembled there, well provided with food and ammunition, and all the

appliances modern science has placed at the disposal of a force in a besieged town.

On the 21st May Oku, advancing southwards, was in close touch with the troops of the mobile column from the fortress, who had taken up a position in the isthmus between the Liaotung and Kuantung peninsulas.

The position lay from shore to shore along a line of low hills of from 250 to 350 feet in height and was strongly entrenched. The ground to the front had been cleared of cover, barbed wire entanglements constructed, as well as abattis and mines and two searchlights, while numerous redoubts mounting heavy siege guns were connected by deep trenches, the whole position being about 4,500 yards long, increased according to the tide by 1,500 to 2,000 yards of fore-shore on each flank. The eastern flank was further supported by a Russian gunboat, the "Bobr."

This position was held by the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division and the 5th Regiment 2nd Siberian Rifle Division, in all fifteen battalions and sixty field guns, with thirty heavy siege guns, mostly old Chinese weapons.

On the 25th May Oku concentrated three divisions and the 1st Field Artillery Brigade, in all thirty-six battalions of 216 guns, a total of about 55,000 men.

During the night 25th-26th, the 4th Division attempted an attack which failed. About 4.30 a.m. on the 26th, covered by the artillery, the three

divisions advanced for the attack, the 4th on the right or west side, the 1st in the centre, and the 3rd on the left. The right attack was aided by four Japanese gunboats in Kinchou Bay, but at 11.0 a.m., owing to the tide, two of these boats had to withdraw.

On the right the 4th Division seized Kinchou and occupied the village of Liukiaten. In the centre the 1st Division failed to pass the mines and entanglements in spite of the most desperate attempts, while on the left the 3rd Division was equally unsuccessful. Throughout the day the line time and again advanced and was swept back again until it seemed as if victory must rest with the Russians; however, as the sun was setting Oku called upon his men once more, and with the aid of the gunboats the Russian left was partly turned, and about 7.30 p.m. Stoessel gave the order to retreat, which was accomplished without loss, though seventy-eight siege and field guns were abandoned.

The Japanese loss was 151 officers and 4,173 men, while the Russian was only about 850 all told.

The battle is remarkable for the staunch fighting of both sides, and was a successful frontal attack. The failure of the Russians to prepare for and execute a counter attack undoubtedly contributed to their final discomfiture.

The Russians with some show of reason claimed the engagement as a victory, for they withdrew in face of a stronger force without loss or pursuit, and the guns abandoned were of small value.

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Nogi, who had disembarked the 11th Division at Pitzevo, was joined by the 1st Division, and with this force proceeded to invest Port Arthur, occupying Dalny without resistance.

Oku with the 3rd and 4th Divisions and the 1st Field Artillery Brigade was reinforced by the 5th and 6th Divisions and a brigade of cavalry, and by the 12th June had already passed Port Adams on his march northwards, whither he had been ordered to proceed.

By the night of the 13th the 3rd and 5th Divisions were not far south of Wafangtien, the 4th Division being on the Fenchou Road, twelve miles to the west.

On the 14th the Japanese were in touch with the advanced guard of Stakelberg's troops, and during the afternoon a heavy artillery engagement took place and the Japanese pushed close up to the left of the ground on which the Russians had taken up a position.

Since the news of the investment of Port Arthur became known, the Viceroy and the St. Petersburg authorities had been pressing Kuropatkin to advance in force to its relief.

The political importance of Port Arthur was so great that the civilian authorities were blinded to the hopelessness of the undertaking from a military point of view.

There seems to be not a shadow of doubt that Kuropatkin was as much against this forward move as any soldier in his senses would have been, and that the blame for the gross strategical blunder now

committed by the Russians must not be laid at his door. The original plan of campaign as we have seen, quite properly contemplated inactivity until the army was mobilised; however, in obedience to the pressure of the politicians, Kuropatkin sent orders to General Baron Stakelberg to proceed to the south to attempt the relief of Port Arthur, and it was against him that Oku had struck.

As a result of those arrangements, General Baron Stakelberg left Haichen on the 28th May, and was himself at Wafangou on the 5th June, his orders being to fight the Japanese wherever and whenever he found them. By the 13th June he had concentrated at Wafangou the

1st East Siberian Rifle Division.

Five Batts. 9th E.S. Infantry Division.

2nd Brigade 35th Infantry Division.

Three Cavalry Regiments.

Six Sotnias Cossacks.

Two Horse Artillery Batteries.

1st East Siberian Sapper Battalion.

In all 28,000 men and ninety-two guns.

Reinforcements received during the 15th amounted to about 5,000 men.

The Cavalry having obtained touch with the enemy, General Stakelberg took up a position astride the railway and the Fuchou River.

The right rested on some hills, with a deep ravine in front; the centre lay across the plain, while the left was on some low hills.

Southwards a screen of more lofty hills hid the movements of the Japanese. The whole position was about three and a-half miles long, and rough shelter trenches were constructed, about nine inches deep, with fifteen inches of parapet.

Oku's force, engaged on the 15th, was 3rd and 11th Divisions 1st Cavalry and 1st Field Artillery Brigade.

During the fighting on the 14th the Japanese reconnoitred the Russian position, and it appears that the Russian Cavalry failed to discover the Japanese 4th Division.

At any rate, while the Japanese prepared to deliver a flank attack by their left, the Russian orders for the 15th were for an attack on the Japanese right by the Brigade of the 34th Infantry Division.

This Brigade, which had been in reserve at Wafangou, was therefore moved to the left, but Stakelberg was expecting troops by train on the 15th to replace his reserve.

The morning of the 15th opened with a dense fog, which favoured the advance of the Japanese, but by 5.30 a.m. the fog had lifted, and the Russian Artillery opened fire.


The Japanese 3rd Division advanced against the Russian left, but so heavy was the fire that in spite of the close and accurate support of the Artillery, no progress could be made, and the strong counter attacks of the Russians were with difficulty driven back.

The Japanese left attack by this time had become marked, and six battalions of the 9th East Siberian



## OPERATIONS UP TO MID-JUNE. 27

Rifle Division which had arrived by train were sent to support it. This reinforcement enabled it to hold out for some time longer, but about 10 a.m. the heights were carried, and although two battalions of



the Tobolsk Regiment, which had just arrived, were sent there, by 11.30 the Japanese had reached decisive range.

The Russian right therefore fell back, but owing to defective signalling arrangements the left was unaware of the retrograde movement, and was severely handled during the withdrawal by the dismounted fire action of the Japanese Cavalry Brigade.

## 28 RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR ON LAND.

The Japanese were too exhausted to pursue, except by shell fire, but a Russian detachment of one battalion that was covering the right rear was caught by the 4th Division and annihilated. The 6th Division was not engaged.

The Japanese lost 1,170 men killed and wounded.

The Russian loss was apparently about 4,000 killed and wounded, and 300 prisoners. Stakelberg withdrew, covered by Samssonoff's Cavalry, and halted at Sing-jo-Chong on the 18th, where he remained until the 21st, whence he withdrew to Haicheng, and then to Tashikiao.

Criticisms on the action have been numerous, and the failure of the Russian Cavalry to locate the left flank division of the Japanese has in particular come in for a well-merited share of obloquy.

It has been stated, however (and this is the most remarkable part of the story), that the presence of this Division *was* actually reported by the Cavalry, but that Stakelberg, or his chief of the staff, had so little confidence in the Cavalry officer who made the report that they refused to give it credence, or indeed take any action to verify it. The Russian Cavalry was greatly stronger than the Japanese, yet we find that the Japanese Cavalry Brigade was able to inflict much damage on the main body as it retired.

The Japanese gunners never gave the Russian Artillery a chance, but they outnumbered them by two to one, and besides, the Russian gunners had only just received their new Q.F. guns, and shot very

badly with them. The Russian counter-attack on the Japanese right is stated to have taken the following remarkable formation. It was delivered by a brigade under General Gerugros supported by twelve guns:—

Eight companies formed the firing line.

Four battalions the second line.

Three battalions the third line.

Extended over a front of less than 1,500 yards.

What wonder, says Löffler, that a formation allowing only about one-third of the men to use their rifles was found unsuitable to attack against men armed with magazine rifles?

Löffler's criticism of the position taken up by Stakelberg is, that it was divided in half by the Fuchou river running in a valley one and a-half miles wide with steep sides, and therefore that timely mutual assistance by either wing was wellnigh impossible.

The only hope of success lay in concentrating as far as possible on one bank, preferably the left, and endeavouring to force the enemy off his line of communication with Port Adams.

Meanwhile Nodzu had disembarked the 12th Division at Takushan, and with a borrowed Brigade of the Guards formed the 4th Army.

A glance at the map in Chapter V. will now show the position of the Japanese armies, not yet in touch with one another, but preparing to close in on their objective, Liauyang.

## 30 RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR ON LAND.

Oku was based on Talienwan, Nodzu on Takushan, and Kuroki on the Yalu, while Nogi utilised Dalny.

A short halt was now made before the armies advanced, during which the communications were organised, and it may be as well to examine briefly the strategy and arrangements of both sides up to this date.

## CHAPTER IV.

### A CONSIDERATION OF THE OPERATIONS ON EITHER SIDE UP TO MID-JUNE, 1904.

IN the first chapter we saw that though Russia, through her enormous size and vast population, is stronger than Japan, yet, that at the point of contact between the two forces—that is to say, in Korea and Southern Manchuria, and the waters of the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan—Japan had a superiority of strength immediately available. These facts need no corroboration, they are evident from the very slightest consideration of the case.

On the other hand, should Japan not be able to establish, not merely a superiority, but a considerable superiority, at sea, it would be a matter of great difficulty for her to land and maintain an army in Southern Manchuria of force able to cope with that which Russia could place in the field within a few months of the outbreak of war.

It is, however, evident that Russia must at first stand on the defensive, and it was to meet this necessity that her original Plan of Campaign was drawn up.

This Plan, it is now well known, was :—

1. To mobilise the existing three Army Corps, Railway Troops and Garrisons in the Far East by calling in their Reservists.

## 32 RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR ON LAND.

2. To increase this force to six Army Corps and two Divisions of Cavalry as a Field Army beyond Railway Guards and Garrisons.

It was recognised that this operation might take six months, and it was calculated that the advance of the Japanese from some port in Southern Manchuria must be slow. But the landing would only take place six weeks after the outbreak of War, on account of the necessity to establish a naval superiority, and that in any case, the navy in the Far East, sheltered by Port Arthur on the flank of the Line of Communication to Japan, could seriously impede the conveyance of troops, reinforcements, and supplies.

It was confidently expected that the landing would take place in Southern Manchuria. Now the actual course that events took was briefly as follows :—

Within two days of the outbreak of War, the Russian Fleet, except four cruisers and a few torpedo-boats, was blockaded in its own port, and the Japanese were free to land where they would.

They had already elected to land an Army in Korea, and did so at Chemulpo, slowly advancing on the Yalu whither the Russian advance posts had been pushed forward. It was not until nearly three months after the outbreak of War that the Japanese entered Southern Manchuria, and invested Port Arthur.

## CONSIDERATION OF THE OPERATIONS. 33

Löffler criticises the strategy of the Japanese thus:—

“As soon as the result of the first naval engagement was known, it became evident that troops to the number of at least two Divisions could have been landed at Pitzevo or Port Adams, and at that time a Division would have sufficed to mask Port Arthur, while the railway would have formed an available line for supplies, and the remaining Division would have advanced along it to unmask Niuchwang and Takushau, either of which could have been used as a port of debarkation. A large army would then have been landed, which would have forced the Yalu troops to withdraw to avoid being cut off, and Korea would thus have fallen a prize to Japan without striking a blow, and could have been occupied by a reserve Division.”

Major Löffler quotes the following sentence from Clausevitz (*vom Kriege*, Book VI., Chapter I.):

“What is the purpose of Defence? To hold! To hold is easier than to acquire, and it follows that with equal means, to defend is easier than to attack. But wherein lies the greater ease of holding or defending? In this, that every moment of time which is unemploycd, is of advantage to the Defender. He reaps where he has not sown. Every oversight, every moment wasted by the attacker, through fear or mistake, is so much given to the Defender.”

There is no doubt that the Russians had extraordinary luck in this matter. Further, Port Arthur could have been invested in the beginning of March,

### 34 RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR ON LAND.

and much loss of life saved to the Japanese, while as a much smaller number of troops would be required for the siege, more would be available for the Field Army.

“Time was everything, and we must utterly condemn the politics that sacrificed military necessities to the political advantages of the occupation of Korea. If ice prevented a landing in the Liautung Peninsula in February, then diplomacy should have averted the War until the right moment. The Japanese had every advantage (of course after the initial naval success, but they evidently counted on this), and failed to utilise them.”

Such is an outline of this well-known German military writer's views on the Japanese strategy, and though we may differ from them in details, yet we must admit their substantial truth. The Japanese fully admit their mistake now, and it was destined to cost them dear.

Looking at the case with unprejudiced eye, and remembering that the object of the soldier is to enable the politician to obtain the ends believed necessary to the welfare of his country, we cannot, I think, quarrel with the original occupation of Korea, but the landing of so large a force as 45,000 men to solemnly parade through a country of such difficulty was an operation of War the value of which is not apparent.

Assuming that Japanese diplomacy could not put off the War until the harbours were ice free, then



surely a Division and a Cavalry Brigade would have been enough to occupy Seoul, and push on northwards to gain touch with the Russians. The Japanese must have been aware of the strength of the Russian forces in Manchuria and east of Lake Baikal; they must have realised the time that mobilisation would require, and they must have seen that it was an hopeless impossibility, or, at least, the most absurd strategy to detach a considerable force to advance into Korea.

At any time the harbours might be ice free, and what would have been the position of Zasuich's force if, instead of waiting on the Yalu, he had advanced into Korea, and then found that a Japanese force had landed at Antung or Takushan? The only explanation is that the Japanese were so determined to leave nothing to chance, that they were over cautious.

This is also sufficient to account for the delay in landing Oku's Army until after the battle of the Yalu, wasting precious days when Port Arthur was becoming strong enough to hold larger and larger forces of the Japanese fast, which might otherwise have been available with the Field Army.

The Japanese seem also to have over-estimated the Russian forces in Manchuria and South Ussuri, to judge from a conversation with an important Japanese military official, recounted by General Ian Hamilton. The actual numbers available as Field Troops at the commencement of operations were only about 60,000, the remaining troops in the Far East being required for Railway Guards and Garrisons.

## 36 RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR ON LAND.

There were reserves east of Lake Baikal available to bring these troops up to 75,000 men, that is three Russian Army Corps, but the distances were so great that even these reserves would hardly join the colours much under two months.

The more one considers the matter, the more clear is it that Japanese strategy during the first three months of the War was cautious to an excess bordering on the dangerous. The ports of the Liautung Peninsula were ice free at the end of March, as was Takushan ; why, then, did the Japanese General Staff delay the disembarkation of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Armies till May ?

However, as Major Löffler admits, it is easy to be wise after the events.

With regard to organisation, it must be admitted that the Japanese showed wonderful skill in the management of the debarkation and supply of their troops. Long though the march through Korea took, there is no doubt that as an achievement of military organisation, it was a splendidly managed affair. The Japanese transport and supply arrangements were wonderfully worked, and not even the barren character of the country, nor the lack of a road that could be called better than a mere track, prevented the punctual arrival of troops and supplies at their destinations.

The transport was chiefly two-wheeled carts, generally moved by hand power, though occasionally with ponies or mules, and this was supplemented

## CONSIDERATION OF THE OPERATIONS. 37

by gangs of Korean and Chinese porters. Any one who has served in the East or in Africa knows how long a line of carriers is required to provide the wants of even a small column of a few score of men, and can form some idea of the immense difficulty of transporting food in this fashion for large bodies of troops, and for the carriers and ricksha porters themselves. The Russians, on the other hand, were able to draw on the fertile districts of Manchuria for their supplies, at any rate in part.

After the Yalu was reached Antung was opened as a base for General Kuroki's Army, and a line of tramway, pushed by coolies, was established from thence to Fenghuangcheng. A second line of supply was established by way of the Yalu to Shansong, and thence by cart to Aiyumon, where a depot was established preparatory to the general advance.

Probably the greatest surprise of the war to military men of the great European armies was the failure of the Russian Cavalry. Of these General Negrier writes :—

“How much had Russia's friends hoped from her Cavalry? Why were these hopes falsified? Has her Cavalry proved valueless? Its superiority was, however, indisputable. Superior in numbers, in the quality of its horses, in technical instruction, in the tradition of its regiments, it could act with entire freedom. The Cossacks, the perfection of light Cavalry, would, it was thought, surround its enemy as with a flexible chain, and never let a movement pass unnoticed.

### 38 RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR ON LAND.

According to the opinions of all Cavalry doctrinaires (except the English) the Russian Cavalry, armed with carbines and provided with Artillery, would be master of the situation. Its powerlessness has been the cause of utter amazement. The reason of this was twofold, indifferent musketry training, an Artillery powerless against villages. Yet the Russian Cavalry is much in advance of that arm in the other Continental armies. It has long understood that the carbine is the Cavalry weapon *par excellence*, for the chances of attack mounted are very few. Thus all Russian Cavalry are in reality Dragoons. But the Cavalry had not carried its beliefs to their legitimate conclusion." It is unnecessary to quote more at this point.

The Japanese covered themselves with a screen of small detachments, consisting of the three arms, and this the Cossacks failed to pierce. In the battles of the Yalu, of Nanshan, and Tehlissu there were other points in which the Russian training proved at fault. As has been pointed out by writers innumerable, they filled their trenches with men standing shoulder to shoulder, when a man every two paces would have sufficed; their artillery was badly served, and they made no effort, or but little, to conceal it, and they failed to realise the necessity of an active defence, except at Tehlissu, and there the formation of their counter-attack was of a pattern foredoomed to failure. In fact they did not realise the value of the modern firearm; they clung to the old-fashioned

volley and recourse to the bayonet; they failed to learn the lessons of the Boer War.

At the Yalu and Nanshan the Japanese fought according to the book, that is, the book of the European Army, dense lines pushing forward, regardless of losses, to close range, with a view to a bayonet charge. To push forward to close range is, of course, the object of the attack, but this is not to say that it is to be done in long lines keeping dressing and formation.

Their formations at Tehlissu are said to have been already more flexible. Already they had realised that the men must push forward from cover to cover in flexible lines of skirmishers to establish fire superiority. On either side the men showed themselves to be the best material possible. Both sides displayed perfect coolness under fire, and that courageous tenacity, not only under the stress of danger, but also under fatigue, that is the mark of the good soldier.

It is often lost sight of in England, though never on the Continent, that fortitude under fatigue is a soldierly virtue, at least of equal value to fortitude under the stress of danger. Many soldiers call it the more important virtue of the two.

With these brief criticisms taken from various sources we will for the present be content and proceed to the Japanese advance on Liauyang, and the Russian endeavours to arrest it until their force was complete.

## 40 RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR ON LAND.

It must be remembered that the object of all strategy is to collect a greater force at a given point at the right time than the enemy can do, at the same time preserving the general balance elsewhere in the zone of operations. In this case it is obvious that, could the Russians gain sufficient time, the greater force would be forthcoming.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE ADVANCE ON LIAUYANG.

IN the map at the end of this chapter is shown the position of the Armies in mid-June. It will be observed that Oku, with three Divisions and a Cavalry and Artillery Brigade, was about Wafangou, having just defeated Stakelberg at the Battle of Tehlissu (or Wafangou). Nodzu, with a Division and a Brigade of Guards, had advanced a short distance from Takushan and was busy organising his transport, while Kuroki was at Fenghuancheng with a Brigade at Aiyumon covering the collections of a supply depot. Kuroki had two-and-a-half Divisions, a Reserve Brigade, and Brigades of Cavalry and Artillery.

Stakelberg, after his defeat, had retired leisurely, followed by Oku, whose advanced troops were in constant touch with Ssamssonoff's Cossacks. Stakelberg reached Hsungyancheng on the 17th June, and on the 21st withdrew to Kaiping, remaining there till the 5th July.

The Russians still occupied a widely extended line.

I. Siberian Corps about <sup>Yinkou</sup>~~Tinkon~~ and Tashikiao.

IV. Siberian Corps about Tashikiao with part of the II. Siberian Corps and the X. European Corps, and part of the II. Siberian about Simutchong, while Count Keller, with the bulk of the III. Siberian Corps

## 42 RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR ON LAND.

and Rennenkampf's Cossack and Cavalry Division, watched Kuroki at Fenghuancheng.

On the 16th of June Nodzu advanced in the direction of Simutchong, covered by a screen of Cavalry and Light Infantry, and on the 20th Oku moved forwards towards Kaiping, which was found occupied by the Russians, who were holding a strong defensive position.

On the 7th July, at daybreak, an enveloping attack was delivered, but the Russians had already vacated the position (which was only occupied by Ssamssonoff's Cossacks) and fallen back on Tashikiao. Direct communication between Oku and Nodzu was now opened up.

On Kuroki's right there were affairs at Saimachi on the 7th June, and at Aiyumon on the 22nd, but neither was of any importance, and it was not until the 24th June that Kuroki's Army definitely commenced its advance, and on the 27th occupied the passes of Motienling and Fengshuiling. The difficulties had been tremendous, for before making an advance it had been necessary to collect supplies, and this over a mountainous country intersected by deep rivers and unprovided with a single road worthy of the name.

The right advanced from Saimachi, the centre on Lientshankwan, and the left in the direction of the Panholing Pass.

The march was much retarded by heavy rains from 27th June to the 5th July, which destroyed bridges and made the roads impassable to such an extent that



the troops were placed on half rations, while the 12th Division was obliged to actually fall back on Saimachi.

On the 4th July General Count Keller ordered a reconnaissance of the Japanese position on the Motienling, and a battalion of the 24th Regiment and one of the 10th advanced by night, and having surprised the Japanese picquet, pushed on. They were checked by the supports; but, instead of retiring, they held their ground and suffered severe losses in the daylight, when they were obliged to withdraw in face of very superior strength.

On the 17th July General Count Keller was ordered by Kuropatkin to force the Motienling Pass, and, as a result, Keller moved forward with about one-and-a-half Divisions of Infantry. At 3 a.m., Kastalinski, with a Brigade and twelve guns, opened the attack, but the Field Guns were found to be useless, owing to the nature of the ground. The attack was pressed and well supported, and an attempt was made to turn the Japanese left; the attack, however, failed, and the Russians withdrew about 10 a.m. The Japanese did not pursue. On the 19th the Russians had occupied a position at Hsi-o-yen, a few miles north of the pass, and were attacked and driven out. On the 25th July, in consequence of the battle of Tashikiao, a general retirement of the Russian East front was ordered, but on the 31st, Count Keller, whose Artillery was by now armed with the new Long Recoil Q.F. Field Gun, made a demonstration towards the Japanese at Yangtselung, but was obliged to fall

#### 44 RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR ON LAND.

back into his position. During this engagement Count Keller was killed, and during the night, 31st-1st, the Russians withdrew.

Meanwhile, on the 23rd July, Oku resumed his advance, and occupied a line facing the Russian position at Tashikiao.

This position was an admirable one, and lay on a considerable hill connecting by cols with hills to the left and right, both slightly in advance of the centre; the left of the Russian line was pushed forward to hold a spur, possession of which would have enabled enfilade fire to be brought to bear on the centre. The gun positions were admirably concealed, and the Infantry positions were strongly entrenched, with cover in rear for supports, and carefully constructed obstacles covering the approaches.

The front of the position was about nine miles long, but no arrangements for a counter-attack appear to have been made. The I. Siberian and II. Siberian Corps held the position; the Divisions, however, were very weak, and probably the total number did not exceed 40,000 men (exclusive of Cavalry) and 140 guns.

The Japanese had four divisions and a brigade of artillery, in all 53,000 men (exclusive of cavalry) and 252 guns. The attack was mainly delivered by the 3rd and 5th Divisions upon the Russian right, which was their dangerous flank. The attack, however, was a total failure, and it was not until 4.30 p.m. that the Japanese gunners located the Russian batteries.

During the night the Russians, under orders from Kuropatkin, withdrew on Haicheng, and a night attack of the 5th Division found the trenches occupied only by Rearguards and Cossacks, who were driven out and followed by the Japanese.

The Japanese losses were 1,188, while those of the Russians amounted to about 900, most of whom were killed in the night attack.

Niuchwang had been occupied by the Cavalry and was occupied by other troops on the 26th.

On the 28th the 5th Division joined the 4th Army, and on the 1st August Oku again advanced, and occupied Haicheng on the 3rd, the I. Siberian Corps having retired under orders from Kuropatkin.

On the 30th July Nodzu arrived before Hsimucheng and, reinforced by the 5th Division, attacked the IV. Siberian and part X. Corps there on the 31st, securing the position by nightfall; the Russians retreating on Liauyang. The Brigade of the Guards, lent to the 4th Army, now rejoined the 1st. Thus the Japanese three armies on August 1st occupied, roughly, a line from Haicheng through Hsimucheng, Kinchang, Tien-shuichang, ~~Tachang~~ <sup>Kinchang</sup>, in all a front of about forty-five miles, with detachments covering the flanks. By the 4th August the 1st Army had closed to its left still further, thus consolidating the line.

Marshal Oyama had left Tokio on the 5th July, and took command of the Japanese forces in Manchuria.

The weather, and the imperative necessity of the Japanese to organise their lines of communication,

## 46 RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR ON LAND.

forced another delay, and from the 4th to the 25th the quiet was only broken by shots at the outposts and the splashing of the rain.

Meanwhile the *kiaolang* or millet was growing and growing, and it has been suggested, with some probability, that the Japanese fully realised how the high crops would aid their advance, and waited for it to grow. The crops are said to densely cover the lower slopes of the hills, and to attain a height of nearly twelve feet.

The possession of the railway from <sup>Yin Kow</sup> ~~Yingkow~~ to Tashikiao now enabled the Japanese to completely alter their supply arrangements.

Takushan and the Yalu were practically abandoned as lines of supply, though the line through Fenghuangcheng was apparently used until after the battle of Liauyang.

It appears that from now on the bases were as follows:—


1st Army—Talienwan.

2nd Army—Yingkou.

3rd and 4th Armies—Dalny.

On the Russian side great strides had been made in organising the field force satisfactorily; it appears, however, that hardly any of the units were really up to strength, the ordinary battalion numbering from 550 to 650 bayonets instead of 880. Kuropatkin had collected the I., II., III., and IV., and part of V. Siberian Army Corps, the X. European Corps, the bulk of the XVII. European Corps, and about ten

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE ADVANCE  
ON  
LIAO-YANG





battalions of the I. European Corps. The force amounted to about in round numbers:—

150,000 Infantry.

500 Field guns.

25,000 Cavalry.

60 Horse Artillery guns.

At present the force was split into east and south front and was—

*South Front.*—I. Siberian, part of II., remainder II. and IV. Corps as a reserve.

*East Front.*—III. Siberian and X. Corps, with the XVII. Corps in reserve.

As a general reserve there were the remainder of the troops.

Mistchenko with a cavalry division lay in the gap between the two fronts, while Ssamssonoff's Cossacks covered the south front and Rennenkampf's the east front. The positions that the forces occupied at the beginning of August are shown on the map, and they altered but little until the actual battle had commenced.

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE BATTLE OF LIAUYANG.

THE battle now to be fought out was the first great decisive action of the campaign, and its importance was fully recognised on both sides.

The Russians had succeeded in collecting by the 23rd of August a force of about 180,000 men, with 500 Field guns, 60 Horse Artillery guns, and a variously estimated number of heavy guns, apparently about 35.

They had prepared two strong lines of defence, and on the 23rd August still held the advanced line, indicated by dots on the map at the end of this chapter. On the other side the Japanese had not wasted the time during which the rain had held them fast in their position.

The three armies were organised as follows: on the right, 1st Army (Kuroki) with three Divisions, and a Reserve Brigade, and a Brigade of Field Artillery, in which were included twenty heavy howitzers. In the centre, 4th Army (Nodzu); 5th and 10th Divisions. On the left, Oku, with the 3rd, 4th, and 6th Divisions, and a Brigade of Field Artillery, with which were eighteen heavy howitzers. In addition, Marshal Oyama had a Reserve Brigade of Infantry as a general Reserve, and two Brigades of Cavalry, which formed the covering troops of the Army, and



covered also both flanks, assisted by some detachments of Infantry.

The total force was about 140,000 men with 524 guns.

It will be observed that the Russian force was somewhat superior, and particularly so in cavalry, of which the Russians had about 25,000; the Japanese not 10,000.

The force on the 23rd of August was still on a very widely extended line, and Marshal Oyama's orders therefore were firstly directed to secure a concentration of his force.

The first Russian entrenched position extended from Shoushanpu through Mindiatun to Siapu on the Taitseho River, while troops of the XVII. Army Corps and I. Army Corps occupied positions on the north bank of the Taitseho.

The whole position had been carefully prepared, but more particularly on the south front at Shoushanpu, where the I. Siberian Army Corps under Stakelberg fought; this position, naturally one of immense strength, had been prepared with the utmost skill, long lines of trenches, the depth of a man, covered the slopes of the hills, and were nearly invisible at a distance. Gun positions under cover of the reverse slope, with strong epaulements, had been made. All parts of the position were in telephonic communication with the General Officer Commanding, who was also in telephonic communication with headquarters.

The ground to the front for nearly 1,000 yards was cleared of millet. Obstacles were placed in front of the trenches at about 400 to 600 yards distance.

There was a balloon to assist the gunners in the observation of their fire, and numerous observation stations had been arranged for. All that could be done by troops, skilled in entrenching work by the habit of a century, had been carefully thought out.

Lastly, the right flank was protected by the railway embankment and a fortified village. Cover for supports and reserves, and well-defiladed approaches had been made.

The position from Mindiatun to Siapu was held by X. European and IV. Siberian Army Corps, and, though not so strong as Shoushanpu, was a most formidable obstacle to an advancing army.

In reserve were the II. and IV. Siberian Corps, and some of the V. Siberians.

The ground immediately round Liauyang is a plain which stretches away to the Liao River. The railway skirts the mountains. Thus the commencement of the battle took place in the mountains.

Oyama's orders were for a concentration against Liauyang by the 28th August.

By this day, Kuroki was to have reached the Tanho, and Oku and Nodzu were to be in front of the Russian's entrenched lines.

Kuroki moved on the 23rd, for the country was most difficult, and the advance must be slow, slower

still on account of the rains; by the 26th all his divisions were in close touch with the enemy. Fighting was severe all day, and during the night, 26th-27th, a general attack was delivered. The 12th and 2nd Divisions made but little headway, but the Guards succeeded in outflanking the right of the III. Siberian Corps.

The Russians, however, during the 27th strengthened their right, so that the Guards were left in an awkward predicament. The Japanese, however, succeeded in surrounding and cutting to pieces the 122nd Regiment, and capturing six guns on the Russian left.

This loss on the left caused Bilderling to withdraw the Division which had suffered the loss over the Taitseho and reinforce the X. Corps. The Russians determined on a counter-stroke against the Guards next day, and a night attack to recover the guns. For this object, orders indeed were already issued, when Army Orders from Kuropatkin arrived directing a retirement behind the Tanho River.

There was fortunately no rain, and the retreat was conducted without loss, though the passages were under easy artillery range from the hills east of the river.

The retirement was undoubtedly correct, for the X. Corps was in great danger, with the Tanho in rear, and no support from the south front, which had withdrawn to the entrenched position, would be forthcoming.

The general situation, therefore, demanded the retirement, in spite of the wishes of the Commander of the east front.

Why Kuroki failed to seize his opportunity on the 27th is a mystery. Perhaps something in Army orders; perhaps the difficulty of the country for artillery. The Russians passed the Tanho without molestation, though the crossings, as has been remarked, were under easy range from the hills.

On the 27th the Japanese 1st Army lay :

2nd Division : Taamping on the Tanho.

12th on the road from Taamping to Yinshuputse.

Guard on the heights of Shiu.

Guard Reserve Brigade on the Ponsyho River.

Oku and Nodzu had advanced on the 26th, and the Russian south front fell back without fighting to their entrenched positions.

On the 28th there was again only a rearguard action in this front.

On the 28th Kuroki's advance was resumed, but the roads were bad and the defence of the Russian rearguards obstinate.

The evening of the 29th finally found the Russians in their carefully prepared and entrenched positions, which stretched from the steep-sided height at Shoushanpu to the low heights just east of Fantsiatun, then an apparent gap, and then from Zosantun over the hills south of Mindiatintse, north Mindiasan, east Yatuchi.

The position was generally commanded by hills to the south ; its character has been already described.

The town of Lianyang was further defended by a second line, with sixteen redoubts or forts in a half-circle from north of the station through Tshuntaitse to Ofa, on the Taitseho River.

The right was held by the I. Siberian Corps, then the III, Siberian, and then the X. European Corps. Mistchtenko's Cavalry covered the right. Further in rear was Ssamssonoff with forty-eight squadrons and three batteries. In reserve stood the IV. Siberian Corps and half II. Siberian Corps, the latter behind the gap in the line.

On the right bank were part of the I. European, part of the V. Siberian, and the XVII. European Corps, who held the Taitseho. The Ponsyho was watched.

Japanese Army Orders for the 29th were for an advance of the 2nd and 4th Armies against the south front, and for part of the 1st Army to change banks of the Taitseho.

It was considered certain that the Russians would fight.

The left wing (Guard) of the 1st Army was to support the main attack by advancing on the heights north and north-west of Mindiasan.

The 12th Division alone was to cross the river. The 2nd assist the Guard.

Evidently the main pressure was to be by the 2nd and left wing of the 4th Armies, where three to

four Divisions extended over three to four miles of front only.

The attack was well delivered and pushed home, but without any success. On the right the Guards pushed in very far, one regiment, the 3rd, reaching the lower trenches, but an attack in the dark failed, and the Divisional Commander ordered these gallant troops to withdraw. The 2nd and 4th Armies failed. Some detachments that pushed into the gap between the fronts were cut to pieces by cross fire.

The attack by the left having failed, the right must have been tried again, but during the 30th what appeared most reliable and important information of a general Russian retirement was received at headquarters.

Detachments of the enemy were reported from all sides as withdrawing, and a train heavily loaded was said to be leaving Liauyang every six minutes for the north.

It was believed that the Russians wished to avoid a decisive action. The 1st Army was therefore ordered to push north, the 4th Army extending to cover the movement and the gap in the line.

As a matter of fact, the Russians had really no intention on the 30th of evacuating their position, but the effect of the movement by the 1st Army was extraordinary. The Russians weakened the south front to prolong the east face towards the north, and had the 4th Army followed the 1st north, the effect might have been far greater.

At 11.30 p.m. on the 30th the 12th Division began the passage of the river ; they were followed by a brigade of the 2nd, and the Guard Reserve Brigade was ordered to clear the left bank, and then cross to the north bank of the Taitseho.

A bridge at Kangtuantse was only completed by 8 p.m. on the 31st. The left wing of the 4th Army, and the 2nd Army renewed the attack on the Russian main position, with the result that more and more of Kuropatkin's reserve was drawn into the fight between Sinlitun and Mayetun.

Oyama's reserve was also thrown into the fight on the right of the 2nd Army.

On the night of September 1st, from 7 p.m. till midnight, the artillery kept up a fierce bombardment on the Russian position. By 2 p.m. the obstacles were destroyed by the Pioneers, and the position occupied shortly afterwards. It was, however, only lightly held, for on the evening of the 1st the Russians had crossed the Taitseho, leaving rear-guards only in the position, who fell back to the forts after the capture of the position.

Some counter-attacks by the Russians during the 1st were beaten off by the guard and 10th Division (4th Army).

At 5 a.m. the Russian patrols had reported the passage of the river by the Japanese, and by evening the 12th and part of the 2nd Division were in close touch with the XVII. Army Corps, east of Sikwantun.

Danger to his line of retreat had decided Kuropatkin to withdraw to the north bank of the Taitseho, to strike the Japanese there.

The scheme was complex on account of the paucity of bridges, and the possibility that during movement his rearguards might be overwhelmed, his line of communication cut, and his columns caught on the march.

Kuroki, seeing the movement, endeavoured to advance, but was too weak, with half his army still supporting the 4th Army. The strong Russian position on the heights just north of Sikwantun (called Mandshujama by the Japanese) was, however, seized by half the 2nd Division on the night of the 1st-2nd September.

The Guard Reserve Brigade was expected to reach the coal mines on the 2nd. The works south of Liauyang were shelled, and on the 2nd, Oyama endeavoured to capture them, but failed.

Under the expectation that the southern force would achieve their object, Kuroki pushed forward hard on this day. Only the northern brigade of the 12th Division had any success. General Orloff, with the 54th Division, was covering the left of the XVII. Corps, and, seeing that the XVII. Corps were ordered to retake the Sikwantun heights, made a vigorous attack.

The XVII. Corps failed, and Orloff was left isolated, and very severely handled.



The I. Siberian Corps, which had held the Shoushanpu position, and passed through the rear-guards of the 2nd and 3rd on the 31st, had crossed the Taitseho, and was put into the fight on the Russian left, alongside the XVII. Corps.

During the day, half the Guard Division and the main strength of Artillery had arrived just south of the Taitseho, and all the Guard Division would cross next day.

The Russians had the XVII. Corps opposite Sikwantun, and still engaged with the X. Corps, partly in support, and partly close at hand to the rear. North of the XVII. the I. Siberian Corps was engaged, having been marched straight from their position at Shoushanpu, which they had held against double their numbers on the 29th and 30th.

Kuropatkin had now to decide whether to continue the fight or retire; if he fought further he must be successful or destroyed; he could not withdraw.

It would seem that there was a splendid chance to overwhelm Kuroki, for north of the Taitseho, even allowing for very heavy losses and the total loss of Orloff's Division, the Russians would have still had a great superiority of guns and a three-fold superiority of infantry.

The morning of the 3rd found that the Japanese 2nd Division had driven back the XVII. Corps by a night attack, and General Kuropatkin issued orders for the retreat.


In the words of Loffler: "The success of a fight is the sum of the successes in the different parts of the field. The reports of success or failure have a very great effect on the mind of the commander, even against his will. Further, after a protracted fight there is a difficulty in collecting forces, all of which considerations operate on the mind of the general. The truth of these statements is shown in this battle, for the sum of failures counterbalanced the successful position, and induced Kuropatkin to look to his rear. Also the scattering of his forces made it difficult to collect men to take advantage of the opportunity of the moment."

I. Siberian Army Corps and remains of 54th Division were to cover the right, marching by the Yentai Coal Mines with Samssonoff's Cavalry.

Behind the I. Corps marched the III. in a north-west direction, and X. and XVII. on the Mandarin Road. A rearguard remained till the 4th at Sachutun. The retreat commenced on the evening of the 3rd, after the destruction of the depots and bridges.

Kuroki could do nothing. The 2nd and 4th Army, in spite of their gallantry and heavy losses, were held off by the rearguards in the forts, and at 10.0 p.m., when they were carried, they were practically abandoned by the Russians. It was not until 1.30 p.m. on the 4th that Kuroki thoroughly understood the position; mist and

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a break in his telegraphic connection with headquarters held him fast. When he did advance, his worn-out troops could do nothing with the rear-guards. The 2nd and 4th Armies threw bridges on this day.

The battle cost the Russians about 30,000, the Japanese 40,000 men. Though a success it was no victory, for there was no pursuit and no demoralisation of the vanquished. Kuropatkin had undoubtedly had a chance of overwhelming Kuroki; on the other hand he was falling back on to reserves, drawing the Japanese after him away from their base. The Japanese Commander-in-Chief's tactics may be open to criticism. It is a question whether the position could not have been turned, and when the result of Kuroki's successful passage of the river was seen, it was unpardonable to go on butting at a wall and not to support him in force, instead of actually weakening him by holding one of his divisions on the south bank.

Even if the 4th Army had only demonstrated, it would have helped the 1st Army, and with less tired troops Kuroki might have done something in the pursuit.

A Japanese Division was ordered on the 3rd to pass Liauyang by the west, and press on in pursuit. It turned aside into the fight. To march to the sound of the guns is not an invariable rule. Before, and during a fight, perhaps it is right, but not after, when pursuit is the end in view.

On both sides there were mistakes made, but when the state of the country is remembered it cannot be said that they were extraordinary. It is easy to say that Kuroki missed his opportunity on the 27th while Bilderling was crossing the Tanho. The passages were within easy gun range of the hills on the east bank, but the country over which the guns were to be brought would, by all descriptions, have baffled even English drivers, let alone Japanese with poor horses. Again it is easy to say that Kuropatkin should have taken his opportunity to overwhelm Kuroki's isolated division on the north bank of Taitsho, but his reserves had already been put into the fight and replaced by Stakelberg's exhausted troops from Shoushanpu.

These troops had fought as few men can fight; indeed, their courage and tenacity were only equalled by that of their attackers.

There is no doubt, too, that General Orloff's impetuosity greatly imperilled Kuropatkin's left and line of retreat.

Löffler says that had Orloff been successful, his action would have been held up as a shining example of subordinate initiative. Other accounts attribute to him the panic that seized his troops, for it was only five Japanese battalions that actually cut up and put to flight his eleven battalions with eighteen guns. The Russians fell back from Liauyang rapidly in the following order:—

Sept. 3rd and 4th—I. Corps—Taliengu.

III. „ Liliengu.

Part of I. and XVII.—Sandopa.

X.—Saomatsi.

II., IV., part V.—Tanchepa.

Sept 5th—I. Corps—Chundazuan.

Part I and XVII.—Shilichai.

IV.—Uligai.

Part V. and II.—Lanzitchai.

III.—Kuantchutun.

X.—Sachaipu.

Sept. 6th—I.—Taidziatun.

II., part V.—Suiatun.

III.—Chuanmatun.

X.—Chunchepu.


I., IV.—Mukden.

They were followed leisurely by the Japanese.

## CHAPTER VII.

### THE BATTLE OF THE SHAHO.

AFTER the retreat on to Mukden was ended, and Kuropatkin had collected his troops again to form a general line of defence, the Russian commander set to work to reorganise his army. He had found the bulk of the I. European Corps and the remainder of the V. Siberian Corps at Mukden, and the VI. Siberian Corps began to arrive about the 3rd week in September. A considerable number of men, guns, and horses also arrived during September to





replace casualties; thus, towards the end of September, Kuropatkin had the

I., II., III, IV., V. part VI. Siberian Corps.

I., X., XVII. (European) Army Corps.

4 Cavalry Divisions.

Arrangements had been made to form two more Armies, the one under Gripenberg, the other under Kaulbars. Kuropatkin was to command in Chief.

This force, probably, amounted to 220,000 effectives.

As a sign of the determination of the Czar to carry the matter through, the following further troops were ordered to be mobilised, though they would not be on the theatre of war until the spring of 1905:

61st Reserve Division.

Five European Rifle Divisions.

The VIII., XV. and IV. Army Corps.

Two more Cavalry Divisions.

Thus, by the spring of 1905, the Russians would have quite 480,000 men, and 1,600 guns.

It was generally thought that the difficulties of the Russian supply over the single-lined railway would counter-balance their superiority of force as compared with the Japanese.

As a matter of fact, this was not found to be the case, for, after Japan had arrived at the end of her resources of trained men, and particularly of officers, still the Russian reserves proved

inexhaustible, and the Russian Army at the front stronger numerically than the Japanese.

It is not quite certain whether Alexieff or Kuropatkin decided on the offensive movements now taken. The tone of the Army Orders leads one to suppose that it was the latter, and later information confirms this view.

The troops which had fallen back on Mukden had daily awaited attack. But days and weeks had passed in complete quiet, while strong reinforcements had arrived, and the corps engaged at Liauyang had been refitted and nearly brought up to strength.

A superiority of strength, and the necessity to make an attempt to relieve Port Arthur, would naturally induce the commander to take the offensive.

At the end of September, the Russians stood in and around Mukden with

Part of V. Corps right bank of the Hunho River.

I., III. and part of II. Siberian Corps covering the communication with Tielin, at Fuchun and east of Fulin. Inpan was held in strength. South, the cavalry was in touch with the Japanese, and Mistchenko lay from the railway to the Mukden-Bianyupusa Road, Ssamssonoff on the Fuchan Bianyupusa Road, Rennenkampf further east.

Meanwhile, the Japanese had not been idle. The losses at the Battle of Liauyang had been made

good, and the Divisions thus brought up to strength. In September, a law was passed turning the Home Defence Troops into reserve troops, and the men were used to fill up the losses in the Active Divisions.

The efforts that Japan put forth to provide men are most interesting. Men were, of course, forthcoming, but hundreds of thousands of men are not soldiers, nor hundreds of thousands of soldiers an Army, without organisation or trained officers and non-commissioned officers.

It is easy to provide men, even during a war of any duration, but to train them when all the instructors are required in the fighting line is well-nigh impossible. Further, to train officers and non-commissioned officers, except during the course of an exceptionally long war, such as the North and South Civil War in America, is impossible. In that war, both sides started equally untrained, though the South had the better material, particularly for cavalry, while the North disposed of such regular troops as there were. It was four months before either side could move, and then the result of the battle of Bull Run showed how quite unreliable were the troops on either side, though they were States Militia and Volunteers for the most part.

The Japanese had now called out all their Reserve Brigades to replace the Active Divisions in the garrisons, and some of them, though how many

it is difficult to find out, were now sent to the front.

These Brigades were made up to the strength of Divisions as far as possible, but owing to lack of regimental officers, the regiments had fewer battalions than those of the Active Divisions. Apparently, at the end of September, Oyama had collected eight Active and three Reserve Divisions, besides two Cavalry Brigades and two Field Artillery Brigades, made up to above ordinary war establishments, in all, about 175,000 men, and 650 guns. This force had taken up an entrenched position, and was carefully organising its communications, and awaiting the reinforcements which the new Law would bring it.

The advanced line of the Japanese was accurately known at the Russian Headquarters: it was from the Hunho, north of the branch line to the Yentai Coal Mines as far as Bianyupusa. Behind this line the dispositions of the Japanese were unknown. Apparently the main strength of the enemy lay between the Shaho and the Bianyupusa-Benzihu Road.

Three groups were formed for the advance.

Western under Bilderling, X., XVII. and part of V. Siberian Corps.

Eastern under Stakelberg, I. Siberian, II. Siberian and III. Siberian Corps.

Reserve directly under the Commander-in-Chief, IV. Siberian, VI. Siberian and I. European Corps.

The western group marched on Liauyang.

The eastern from Fuchun or Benzihu.

The gap was filled by the IV. Siberian Corps, which marched from Tyndiapu on the coal mines, followed by the I. Army Corps and the VI. Siberian Corps, which was not quite complete and was held back near Mukden.

On both sides independent detachments threatened the Japanese communications.

In the west a detachment with strong Cavalry crossed the Hunho at Shantun. Further west there was some useless fighting between part of the V. Siberian Army Corps and the Japanese line of communication troops at Liaobeiho.

In the east, Rennenkampf's Cavalry, with strong infantry and artillery supports, according to Japanese reports, occupied Kianchang on the 7th October, and were driven back by a night attack on the 10th.

The detachments, excluding Cavalry, must be put down as at least two divisions.

The battle took the following course:—

On the 5th October, Bilderling advanced slowly and cautiously to gain room for the troops in the hills, entrenching each position that he occupied; advancing thus, he was on the 9th October close to the Schiliho River, with the IV. Siberian Corps at Yansansai. On the same day, the 9th, Stakelberg pushed back the Japanese advanced troops on a position at Bianyupusa. This position, though

lightly held, was strong and carefully prepared, and there was severe fighting before it was taken. On the 10th October, Stakelberg occupied Shumpintaitse,

The III. Siberian Corps was meanwhile engaging the Japanese on the Hualin Pass.

On the 10th, there was fighting along the whole front, but the Russians made but little headway.

On the evening of this day the Russian centre and right were roughly on a line 5,000 yards north of the branch line from Yentai to the coal mines. while the Russians reported that the Japanese had taken the offensive.

Oyama considered that the time had arrived for the counter-stroke.

On the 11th, Oku and Nodzu both advanced, the left of Nodzu and right of Oku on Ulitaitse, and by evening Oku's centre had reached Yandiawan, and his left a line Yudiatentse-Lidiatun, with some advanced troops at Sandepu. Kuroki had stood fast.

On the 12th, Kuroki drove the IV. Siberian Corps out of their position at Yansansai, while Stakelberg could make no advance against the remainder of his troops. The result of the defeat of the IV. Corps was that Stakelberg had to put his Reserve into the gap between his army and that of Bilderling.

Meanwhile, Oku and Nodzu attacked, Oku about Orchidiasa and Alige to Shiliho, Nodzu further west.

The fight was a general Japanese success, for the whole Russian right was forced back, and the defeat of the IV. Corps weakened the Russian left.

Kuropatkin brought up his reserve for a counter-attack, but it failed, and evening found the western Russian wing in retreat.

To form a new reserve, the I. Siberian Corps was withdrawn from the left, and on the 13th took up its position near Losantun.

On the 13th, the Japanese again advanced, and Kuroki could make no headway against the left Russian Army and IV. Corps; while Nodzu became so hotly engaged with the X. and part I. European Corps, that Oku had to assist him first with the 6th Divisions and then with the 4th Divisions.

It has been said that Oku would have helped more by a determined advance, but this is surely carping criticism.

The X. Army Corps, with a division of the I. Army Corps, whose gallantry had partially retrieved the disaster of the 12th, was gradually forced back by Nodzu, while Kuroki forced back the IV. Siberian Corps. The left of this Corps, indeed, was only saved by a portion of the main reserve, the Wyborg Regiment (I. Army Corps). By evening the Japanese were in the gap between the IV. Siberian Corps and X. Army Corps—that is, between the eastern and western groups. The retreat of the X. Army Corps caused Kuropatkin to order the IV. Siberian Corps to withdraw during the night.

On the next day Shahopu was taken by the Japanese, and retaken; taken again and retaken by the 86th and 88th Regiments, who, sent up specially

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by Kuropatkin, who watched the fight from the "hill-top with the tree," drove the Japanese two kilometres south of the village.

Severe but fruitless fighting took place on the west. Stakelberg re-established communication between the eastern and central groups on the road Bianyupusa-Fushun. But though the front was closed again, all hope of success was gone.

On the 15th Bilderling tried again, but unsuccessfully, to take the offensive.

In the evening, by a surprise attack, the Japanese retook Shahopu, and seized the "Hill-top with the tree."

On the 16th the Russians again attempted to take this commanding height. Late in the evening General Putiloff, with a force collected on the field, captured the height, and with it fourteen Japanese guns.

Oku again attacked Bilderling on the north bank of the Shaho unsuccessfully.


On the 17th there was not much fighting, but the Japanese retook Shahopu.

On the 19th fighting ceased along the whole line, and on the 21st the Japanese evacuated Shahopu without fighting. The losses on either side were:—Russians killed, wounded, and missing, 90,000; Japanese, 30,000.

After the battle of the Shaho complete quiet, but for occasional outpost affairs, reigned over the whole front for some months.



# Battles of the Shaho



The two armies, in close touch with one another, entrenched themselves on opposite sides of a general line—Wutchjanin, Linchinpu, Lamutum, Shahopu, Nangansa, Sinluntin, Yansintun.

Heavy guns were brought into the line.

The Japanese covered the left by a force at Sandepu. In the east the forces entrenched at Bianyupusa and Tungou. Further east both forces had detachments on the mountain roads.

Many people have expressed the opinion that this standstill is a phase of modern warfare. As a matter of fact there have been many instances in the past of such standstills, though doubtless they will be more numerous nowadays on account of the enormous forces employed.

Löffler says in this regard:—"Natural human reluctance to leap into the unknown must affect the mind of any leader. A feels too weak to attack B, B too weak to attack A; consequence, a standstill. The Russians awaited reinforcements, the Japanese the fall of Port Arthur.

"Some people too have used the position on the Shaho to support an assertion that modern arms have revolutionised modern war, and brought it to the same state as the Position wars of old days.

"As a matter of fact, the time of the War of Positions was one when the aim of strategy was radically different from to-day.

"Each side strove to gain a portion of the enemy's country, and hold it as his own.

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“Hence extended lines and schemes of fortifications to cover exposed bits of country.

“Modern war aims at destroying the enemy’s fighting force.

“It is true that modern weapons make frontal attack more difficult, but frontal attack was difficult in the days of Frederick the Great.

“The Art of War is still the same: to bring superior numbers on a particular place at a given time. The rule is easy to define; it is the application that requires the artist.

“At the Shaho there was no case of great force outflanking great force. The advantage gained by the Japanese left was only by two battalions, yet their effect was extraordinary.

“Nor can it be said that strategy is altered by the war. More time is needed in the Far East than in Europe for strategical movements, for the country is immeasurably more difficult, the roads fewer and far worse.

“The battle of the Shaho was a hither and thither indefinite fight, in which the Russians failed to utilize their numbers except as dead weight. By skilful handling on the 12th, seven to eight Japanese Divisions attacked five to six Russian. But when they reached the Shaho numbers told, and the balance turned the other way.”

Of the tactics of either side, Löffler writes as follows:—

“It appears that Kuropatkin put in his greatest

force towards the east. The distance, and high and rugged mountains that separated his two wings made communication well-nigh impossible.

“The Japanese had had plenty of time to prepare positions.

“A mark of all tactical operations in the mountains, such as those before Stakelberg, is the length of time movements take, the great difficulties of observation, the difficulty of employing artillery, and the fact that the numberless positions enable small forces to delay large ones.

“It is true that the defender also feels the difficulties of movement, but time is in his hands, for he holds the enemy with weak forces, and concentrates for counter-attacks behind this screen.

“Operations, where part of a force are operating in the hills and part in the plains, are obviously still more difficult to connect.

“The Japanese must hold their communications with Dalny, and this was threatened by a movement in the plains. Also their heavy gun and the numerical superiority would tell more in the plains in the Russian favour.

“It is, therefore, questionable whether an advance by the west, with the eastern wing withheld, would not have been preferable to the course actually taken.

“Further, more reinforcements were constantly arriving from Europe, which could be used to reinforce the east and centre against a counter-blow by the Japanese.

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“Probably it was possible danger to the communications with Tieling that decided Kuropatkin to advance by the east, though this seems a very weak reason. The detachments that tried to work round the Japanese wings and threaten the communications were valueless. They were not strong enough or else too strong.

“When decisive fighting is toward, such detachments are better with their corps, unless, indeed, they are exclusively cavalry. The Japanese proved the foregoing statements to be correct by their action.

“In bold and masterly fashion, Oyama, holding the eastern force in check, closed with the western. The Russians had some success in the hills, neutralized by defeat in the plains, and had to reinforce their western wing, which went very near to suffering a disaster.”

It has been said, probably correctly, that Kuropatkin's action in attacking at the Shaho was due to the necessity to re-establish the morale of his troops. The Russian peasant is probably of all men the last man likely to have his morale shaken by defeat. History has proved that the Muscovite is never so dangerous as when defeated, but yet even this fine material must be shaken by successive retirements. It is no use telling the soldier that his retreat was to improve the strategical position, or that he has inflicted severe losses on his enemy. He wants the tangible evidence of advance over the

captured positions and dead bodies of his opponent to convince him of the truth.

The state of discipline in the British Army during the retreat after the slight repulse at Burgos, is a proof of this fact. Kuropatkin sought to re-establish his troops' morale. What must have been the effect of his failure on his men already partially demoralised, and without their hearts in the business? There is no doubt that the lack of political enthusiasm for their cause weakened the Russian energies throughout the campaign.

The standstill was not broken before the New Year, which brought with it the fall of Port Arthur, and to this part of the theatre of war we must now return.

On the 25th October, Alexieff was recalled, and Kuropatkin put in supreme command. In spite of his lack of tactical successes, Kuropatkin was still implicitly trusted by the court, the people, and the army.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### THE SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR.

ON the 26th May, 1904, Oku had attacked General Stoessel in his entrenchments at Nanshan, covering the isthmus which leads to the peninsula on which Port Arthur stands.

After a bloody engagement, the entrenchments were occupied by the Japanese, and the Russians retired to their lines outside Port Arthur.

Oku now turned to advance towards the north, while General Nogi with the 1st and 11th Divisions advanced towards Port Arthur to invest the Fortress.

Nogi occupied Dalny without hindrance, and after clearing the harbour of mines, formed his base at this place and landed there his siege train, the 9th Division, and a Reserve Brigade.

The Russians had, as we have seen, utilised the three months' grace since the commencement of the war to good purpose. They had increased the garrison until it amounted, apparently, to about 40,000 men, including some volunteers and three sotnias of Cossacks; they had sent in immense supplies of ammunition and arms, and filled the store-houses to overflowing. All kinds of material for the construction of forts, repair of ships and guns, installation of electric lights, telephonic

communications, etc., had been despatched, and the garrison had not wasted its time.

In addition to the troops, the garrison included the remains of the Pacific Squadron, on board of which were about 10,000 sailors, and these men and the armament of the ships were utilised later in the defence of the Fortress.

At the time of the outbreak of war, the permanent defences, except on the seaward side, had not been completed, but during these months this had been done, and new lines had been constructed, until the defences occupied the positions shown in the sketch. Massive redoubts of strong profile and great thickness of earth parapet were placed in every advantageous position, and while cover was provided for the men until the enemy's infantry should arrive near the forts, entanglements and mines were arranged to delay the assaulting troops at the most critical points.

The Russians have always been the staunchest defenders and the most skilful constructors of entrenchments in Europe, and the task of the Japanese was certain to be a most formidable one.

The arrangements for the siege were not hastened, and they were not completed until the middle of July.

On the 25th June the Army had advanced, and by the night of the 27th and 28th June the line of Russian field works had been captured or abandoned by the enemy.



On the 3rd and 4th July an attempt was made by the garrison to recapture these positions, which threatened Dalny, but though the attack was most obstinately maintained for two days and two nights, it failed. The Russians now occupied the first line shown on the plan, extending from Triple Peaks to the sea on the south.

On the 26th July, without any really adequate artillery preparation, an assault was made on these positions, and continued during the 27th and 28th, both by day and night. On the 26th the Russian Fleet endeavoured to assist the defence on the right flank, but was obliged by the Japanese Fleet to retire under shelter of the guns of the fortress. The Japanese Fleet then assisted the attack on the Russian right.

The fighting, which was almost continuous by day and night along the whole line, was of the most desperate character, and nothing could have exceeded the gallantry of the Japanese Infantry, which, not appalled by terrible losses, pursued the assault right up to the obstacles, even succeeding in destroying many of them. The assaults were, however, generally unsuccessful, until they at last succeeded in outflanking the Russian left, when the whole line of defences became dangerous, and the Russians fell back to their second line—Green Mountain, Wolfs Mountain, High Mountain, Long Mountain. This position, it will be observed, is nearly eight miles long, and proved too extended, and their left

flank having again been turned, the Russians evacuated this line also, and fell back to their third line, which is shown in the map.

From this time the siege of the actual Fortress may be said to have commenced.

It will be seen that the defences on the landward side are divided broadly into two divisions, east and west of the valley of the Lunho, through which runs the railway and the road.

This valley is about a mile wide. The eastern section shows an almost continuous enceinte of great redoubts connected by deep trenches, with advanced works closely connected with the enceinte, and powerful forts on hills behind the line.

The western section does not afford a well marked line, but every hill was covered by a powerful fort, affording one another mutual support, and covering lines of entrenchments were made on every spur or bit of rising ground.

Both flanks connect with the seaward batteries. The valley was covered by several forts, of which the most important were those about Suichiyin, and Fort Kuropatkin.

On the night 7th-8th isolated forts in advance of the Russian right on the Takoshan Mountain were stormed, and there was severe fighting about Suichiyin, but the attacks failed.

Meanwhile positions for the siege guns were being prepared.

The losses on the Japanese side had up to this point been about 9,000 men killed and wounded. The force at General Nogi's disposal now amounted to three Active Divisions, two Reserve Brigades, the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade, and a siege train; in all about 65,000.

The siege train consisted of:—

28 4·7-inch Howitzers.

40 4·7-inch Guns.

72 6-inch Mortars.

24 3·5-inch Mortars.

16 6-inch Howitzers.

4 4·1-inch Guns.

With the exception of the 6-inch Howitzers, very few of these weapons were adequately powerful for the task before them, a clear proof that the exigencies of the siege had not been so carefully thought out by the Japanese staff as almost every other detail of the military organisation.

From the 9th to the 19th there was heavy but desultory cannonading along the whole front, but the Japanese attacks were generally unsuccessful. One on the 14th on Angle Mountain failed, though some detached works extending towards Louisa Bay were occupied, and on the night of the 19th-20th a gallant attack was made on Fort Kuropatkin; this was partially successful, but a counter-attack drove the Japanese back again.

By the 19th the whole of the Japanese Siege Artillery was in action, and from the 20th to the 24th

the Japanese Infantry made a gallant attempt to storm the line of works. The line of attack was on both sides of the Lunho Valley. On the right the works on Angle Mountain were occupied, while on the left the Japanese succeeded in entering the West Panlunchan Fort and capturing some of the redoubts south of Suichiyin, but a counter-attack drove them back.

Finally the attack ceased, and the Japanese fell back to their lines with a loss of 14,000 men, due partly to an inadequate preparation.

The force with which the Japanese had commenced the siege, viz., three Active and one Reserve Division and a siege train, probably amounted to about 65,000 men, but the terrible losses had considerably reduced the number; these were, however, gradually made good.

It is almost impossible to estimate the Russian losses at the various engagements, and no data sufficient to base calculations on are yet published.

There seems to be no doubt that this great attack was premature, and General Nogi has been much blamed for it by certain Continental critics. We do not, however, know what his orders were; his army was certainly urgently required in Manchuria. At any rate, he now fell back on to more formal methods of siege warfare, and divided his attack into three sections.

About this time the Japanese siege train was

strengthened by the arrival of some naval guns and six 11-inch Howitzers.

The right wing attacked the north-west front, and its objective gradually became 203 Metre Hill, from which direct fire on the town and harbour could be used. The centre attacked the Erlungshan and Kikwanshan groups of forts, and the left the Kinkishan and Payiushan groups. Each section had an Active Division detailed for it.

Quite the most extraordinary part of the siege is the way in which slow sap work was despised by the Japanese, contrary to all modern ideas. The attacks were made in great force, and it was not until the men reached comparatively close range that they began to entrench themselves and advance by sap and mine; like the attack of the Canadians and Gordons in the laager at Paardeberg.

From the 19th to the 23rd September another general attack was made on the works on the north and north-west, as it was believed that the approaches were sufficiently far advanced and the breaches in the forts practicable. The attacks were directed on Fort Kuropatkin, which covered the town water supply, and on 203 Metre Hill.

Fort Kuropatkin and the entrenchments about Suishiyin were captured, as also was 203 Metre Hill. But a vigorous counter-attack drove the Japanese off this last important height.

Every attempt to penetrate into the line of permanent works was repulsed with fearful loss, and

wherever the Japanese did obtain a foothold they were dislodged by counter-attacks.

After this there were four weeks of steady bombardment and approach work, broken, however, by constant advances and attacks by the Japanese, under cover of which the trenches were advanced towards the line of forts; and constant sorties by the garrison, many of which were successful in temporarily destroying the approaches.

The third general attack began on the 25th October, and lasted till the 3rd November, during the whole of which time the fighting was of the most desperate character. The attack was partly anticipated, for November 2nd is the Mikado's birthday, and Port Arthur would have been a welcome birthday present.

The attack was directed this time on the north-east and east fronts, and ran a similar course to the former ones, that is to say, that the Japanese gained entrance to several forts, and were driven out by counter-attacks, so that the line remained in possession of the defenders, not, however, without being weakened, for during the attack many guns were spiked and many of the forts were seriously damaged by mines, and at any rate the besiegers had captured every work in front of the line of permanent forts.

No exact information is available as to when the 7th Division arrived to reinforce the Japanese Army, weakened by its fearful losses. It seems, however,

to have been just before this last assault, in which it apparently took some part. How far losses were made good in the other divisions is not at present ascertainable.

The Japanese had now got so close to the Russian works that the only method of approach possible was by the ordinary sap, and so parallels and approaches were laid out, mines were dug towards the works. About the 20th November they had reached the ditch of the Erlungshan Forts, but failed to capture them. On the 26th November the fourth general storm began; the 1st and 7th Divisions attacked the north-west section, at 203 Metre Hill, and the 9th and 11th Divisions the central section, Erlungshan and Kikwanshan Forts.

The attack on the centre failed, but on the 5th December the famous 203 Metre Hill was captured, and a Russian counter-attack on the 6th driven back.

Thus, at last, at fearful cost, had the Japanese made themselves masters of this all-important point, from which the harbour could be shelled.

It is recorded that the hill had been under constant bombardment day and night for three months without intermission, and that there was not to be found a square yard on which a Japanese shell had not exploded. Constant attacks and counter-attacks had made the ground a shambles, a "field of corpses," as an expressive German account has it. Löffler pertinently remarks that consideration of the artillery

ammunition expended on this hill, and the fact that it was finally only taken by hand-to-hand fighting, should be proof that artillery is still only the supporting arm, sufficient to satisfy even the most bigoted of the theorists that have of late years filled the Continental military press with their lucubrations on the decisive effect modern Q.F. Artillery will have on the field of battle. The bayonet is still the last resource; that modern fights will seldom actually come to bayonet fighting is probable, but between two equally matched, equally staunch, foes, it must as ever finally decide the day.

The Japanese at once proceeded to shell the harbour until the Pacific Squadron was finally destroyed, and by the 15th December this was accomplished; while on the 18th the "Sebastopol," which was in the outer harbour, was torpedoed.

It was evident that the heroic defence must soon be at an end, and the approaches and mines towards the north and east forts were pushed forward, and on the 20th, after the hardest fighting, the northern Kikwanshan Forts were captured, and the others of this group were thereupon abandoned, and destroyed by the Russians.

During the last few days of December the Erlungshan Forts were also captured, and considerable advance made.

On the 1st January a general storm took place, and the Wantai Forts were captured, with the result that at 4 p.m. of the afternoon of this day General




Stoessel sent his aide-de-camp to General Nogi to inform him that he would surrender the fortress. There is no doubt that further resistance was hopeless and useless. 25,000 unwounded and 15,000 sick and wounded men surrendered, exclusive of volunteers.




Exact accounts of the numbers lost on either side during the siege have not yet been stated, but it would appear that the Russian loss was from 10,000 to 12,000, and that of the Japanese from 45,000 to 50,000.

These are big figures, and it is at any rate open to argument whether the losses were worth incurring. There is no shadow of doubt that after the battle of Nanshan, two divisions at most could have blocked the escape of the Russians from the Peninsula, setting free the rest of the larger force employed by the Japanese in front of the fortress, to join the Field Army.

On the other hand, Port Arthur was of immense political and naval importance. Its capture meant the destruction of the Russian Pacific Squadron, and it would be a tangible success, which would make itself felt in that most overwhelmingly important operation of modern war—ease in borrowing the sinews of war, money.

Löffler writes: "It is apparent that no power the Japanese could place in the field could strike Russia in her heart; it was therefore necessary for them to occupy effectually such possessions of Russia as







were vulnerable to her, and in this aim the capture of Port Arthur was of the first importance.

"Port Arthur sheltered the Pacific Squadron of Russia, and its destruction before the arrival of the Baltic Squadron was all important, for the command of the sea alone enabled Japan to maintain her army in the field; to accomplish this, the capture of the Port was the only means.

"Further, even in May the Russians had not so strong a force in the field as the Japanese, and certainly would not have had, had the Japanese not kept back the 7th and 8th Divisions.

"These considerations were sufficient to make the capture of the Port of first importance, even though its capture would have no effect on the Field Armies."

Of the tactical conduct of the operations it is not so easy to write favourably. The key of the fortress was obviously the Erlungshan and Kikwanshan group of forts. Their capture laid the place bare, and opened the 203 Metre Hill to attack in reverse. Yet the front was divided into three portions, and a most valuable portion of the besieging force, to all intents and purposes, wasted on this.

There is no doubt that had the whole force been concentrated for the attack of one point the fortress would have fallen sooner.

Further, the artillery was to some extent wasted throughout the siege in shooting at random into the

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harbour in order to damage the warships. With the capture of the forts went the capture of the ships, and all the force of the artillery should have been concentrated against the points to be attacked.

Briefly, there was a waste of force, both by a too extensive front of attack, and by misdirection of power.

Of the heroism of both sides it is difficult to write in terms of moderation. The Russians fighting a hopeless fight, suffering from the invariable unhealthy accompaniments of a siege, outnumbered by two to one; the Japanese Infantry sacrificing themselves to break the obstacles for their comrades to advance, or forcing their way to the very ditches of the forts to throw hand grenades, continuing the attacks amid the most awful carnage, both were equally to be admired.

The soul of the defence was General Kondratenko, who was killed in a casemate of one of the Kikwanshan Forts on the 15th December, in company with several other officers, by a bursting shell.

The capture of the fortress released four Active Divisions for the Field Army, and the defence of the Port was handed over to Reserve Troops.

## CHAPTER IX.

### THE BATTLE OF SANDEPU (OR HOKUTAI).

WITH the New Year and the fall of Port Arthur, four Japanese Active Divisions were set free to join the Field Army, which they did in about a month.

On the Russian side, the 1st, 2nd, and 5th Rifle Brigades, and five-and-a-half Brigades of the 16th Corps had arrived, and on the 29th January the 3rd and 4th Rifle Brigades and three Divisions of the IX. Army Corps began to leave Russia, and arrived during March and the first half of April. Large numbers of Reservists to recomplete the ~~cadets~~ <sup>Cadres</sup>, weakened by losses, were also despatched.

Thus the arrival of Nogi's Army did not turn the balance of numbers to the Japanese side of the scale.

During the winter the Japanese had made every effort to put in their whole strength for the decisive battle of the spring, which must be fought.

On September 28th a law was passed calling out five more classes of Reserves, and turning the Home Defence Troops into Active Troops.

It is estimated by one German critic that this law only brought in 90,000 men. The writer is unable to find out what really was produced by this enactment.

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The Reserve (Kobi) Brigades were undoubtedly formed into Divisions, but whereas the Regular Divisions were increased to 16,000 strong, the Reserve Divisions were probably at the outside 12,000 strong.

The scarcity of officers was much felt, and it was useless to promote non-commissioned officers wholesale, for this only transferred the shortage to another rank.

The difficulty was met by increasing the strength of the companies, and whereas the ordinary war strength of a Japanese company is 250, they were at the time of the battle of Mukden increased to 280, or even 300 men, by filling them up with reservists and recruits. It would appear then that, allowing for Garrison Troops in occupation of Korea, and the Lines of Communication Troops, that the Japanese had, as soon as the Port Arthur troops joined,—

13 Active Divisions,

7 Reserve Divisions,

2 Cavalry Brigades,

2 Artillery Brigades,

that is, about 300,000 to 310,000 men, with 950 to 1,000 guns.

It is very instructive to note that the Japanese, whose organisation was wonderful, preferred to increase the strength of the cadres rather than form new units of semi-trained men, led by semi-trained officers and N.C.O.'s.



The Russian reinforcements have been alluded to, and their strength in the early part of January in the Field Army must have been at least 400,000 men with 1,450 guns. From them, however, a much larger proportion of men must be struck off for sickness than the Japanese, possibly as much as 15 per cent., which would bring the available force to 340,000 men.

Until the third week in January the position in Southern Manchuria remained as it had been in October, though the front of both entrenched armies had extended. Except for outpost affairs, only one considerable movement was made. This was a march of a strong body of Russian cavalry under Mistchenko against the Japanese communications, and took place in the first days of January.

After an apparently unsupported patrol had, on the 1st of January, broken the line just north of Hailcheng, the advanced guard of Mistchenko succeeded in breaking it in several places, on the 11th, between Hailcheng and Anshanjan. Mistchenko had divided his troops into three columns. The right one occupied Ningchang, west of Hailcheng on this day, and reached ~~Jingkou~~ <sup>Yinkou</sup> next morning. While a patrol broke the railway six kilometres eastward, the guns set fire to a Japanese magazine close to the place. The two other columns did no good.

On the 13th Mistchenko commenced his retreat, and rejoined the Army on the 15th.

His troops had consisted of the Fourth Don Cossacks, the Caucasian Mounted Brigade, the 51st and 52nd Dragoons, and apparently the Trans-Baikal Cossacks—in all 60 squadrons with 4 batteries. One battery was evidently of the old pattern, for it had common shell, while the new quick firers have shrapnel only. A detachment of Infantry formed a support, probably four or five battalions, under General Kossogowski. These had some fighting with the Japanese Cavalry, and finally retreated. Mistchenko, on his retreat, encountered some parties endeavouring to head him off, but pushed through. His total losses were about 300. This march had very little effect, in spite of the temporary destruction of the line. The fact is that these sort of enterprises are only of utility in the midst of active operations. During a standstill they are of little effect, for there are then always sufficient reserves of food to carry on till the break is repaired, and, as the men are not fighting, sufficient labour to make the repairs very quickly is at hand.

In these pages this has already been pointed out, and as an instance of the truth of the statement, we may note a parallel case in our comparatively little war against the Boers. When a convoy was destroyed while the army was moving on Bloemfontein, the result might have been disastrous to the British force, and was most exceedingly inconvenient, while the constant interruptions to the line in the latter phases of the campaign had but very small effect.

Such efforts as this of Mistchenko's are only valuable if the attacking force can afford to sit down on the line and hold some important point of it. Mistchenko retired in three days, and this from a country full of food and forage. This job would have been as well performed by a few troops as by 60 squadrons. The fact is that the necessity to do something somehow, impelled the movement, and "attacking the communications" and "appearing in rear of the enemy" sounds well in despatches.

From the middle of January a second and more important movement commenced to shape itself—an attack on Sandepu-IIokutai by the right Russian Army. Some movements, possibly with a view to this action, were actually made in December.

The VI. Siberian Army Corps replaced the X. in the entrenchments, and thus the Third Army occupied the central portion of the defensive position. At this time the V. Siberian Corps seems to have belonged to the Third Army, for there is no account of the action of any part of it in the battle of Sandepu.

With the Eastern Army were the I., II., III., and IV. Siberian Corps. Three corps held the front line, the I. Siberian Corps as Reserve about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles to the rear. *Rennenkampf*, with strong Cavalry, and apparently a Brigade of the 71st Infantry Division in support; and latterly, also, a second Brigade, formed of the 5th Battalions of the Siberian Reserve Regiments, was farther east, and on the passes north of Kianchang.

The movement of the Western (Second) Army, began towards the middle of January, when a corps of this army moved westwards; and the I. Siberian Corps, veterans of every fight since the beginning of the campaign, crossed under Stackelberg to the western wing.

On the 20th January the VIII. and X. Corps stood between the Hunho and the Shaho, their outposts on the heights of Pausentun, about  $1\frac{1}{4}$  miles from the Japanese.

Behind these corps the I. Siberian Corps pursued its march westwards, and on the 23rd appears to have come into line to the west.

At first the Japanese force opposing was weak, some Cavalry and two Reserve Brigades, according to the Russian accounts. The villages Hokutai and Sandepu were strongly fortified, and held as supports to their left wing.

The Russian attack commenced on the 25th, and in consequence of its slow development, cannot have surprised the Japanese.

The I. Siberian Army Corps crossed the Hunho on the ice and attacked Hokutai, which, after fierce fighting, fell into the hands of the Russians about 11 p.m.

On the 26th the VIII. European Army Corps attempted to take Sandepu.

The 14th Division, which was on the right bank of the Hunho, advanced by Yantaitse; the 15th Division from the northward.

A brigade of the I. Siberian Corps sought to support from Hokutai. The X. Corps again on the 26th remained halted in their trenches, contented with a cannonade and desultory infantry skirmishing.

By 6 p.m. the town was in the hands of the Russians, except one strongly placed redoubt, which was most skilfully covered with obstacles.

As the village was burning it was abandoned, with the intention of destroying the redoubt next day with artillery fire.

On the 27th and 28th desultory and varying, though severe, fighting took place.

On the 28th, indeed, the X. Corps seems to have moved some men to assist the I. and VIII. Siberian Corps.

The newly formed mixed Rifle Corps, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, and 5th European Rifle Brigades, directly supported the VIII. Corps.

The Japanese 8th Division, newly from Japan and hitherto held in reserve, fought by Hokutai; east of them the 5th Division.

Up to the evening of the 28th, the Japanese also had had no success, and had suffered severe losses from the Russian Artillery fire from Hokutai. Oyama therefore ordered a night attack.

However, about 5.30 on the 29th, the Russians commenced to withdraw by Kuropatkin's order from Hokutai over the Hunho. Kuropatkin states that he feared for his line of retreat, but this seems a weak excuse, and the truth really seems to be that

the whole engagement was fought by him half-heartedly, and under pressure of opinion.

By 9.30 a.m., Hokutai was again in Japanese hands. The Russians remained on the heights of Chantanhonan until the 2nd February, when they were driven out by a surprise attack, but they soon retook the heights.

At the same time as this engagement was taking place, Mistchenko, with his cavalry and the 54th Reserve Division, made a southward sweep to attack the enemy's rear.


This enveloping force seized the villages of Shitaitse and Mamikai on the 25th, and there left the infantry.

The cavalry crossed the Hunho on the 26th, and, after a number of successful skirmishes with weak detachments of Japanese, advanced eastwards. They reached on the 27th the neighbourhood of Landungou and southwards without their presence having any apparent effect on the main battle. The date of Mistchenko's withdrawal is not known, but must have coincided with the cessation of the main fight.

The Russians lost about 10,000, the Japanese about 7,000 in this fight, and during it the 1st and 3rd Russian Armies remained in their trenches, while the men were occupied in exercise drill in close formations, and only a few guns fired a few rounds.

Except the small engagement on the 2nd before mentioned, quiet settled down again on the battlefield until the end of February. The only

# Battle of Sandepu Hokutai



SCALE R.F. 240,000  
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result of the fight of Sandepu was the further extension of the Russian entrenched line westwards, until it covered a line as the crow flies of fifty-seven miles from Syfiantai to Matsiundau, and this excluding the flanking detachments.

Towards the end of February, the movement which led to the bloody battle of Mukden commenced.

Major Löffler writes: "It is no use to criticise the battle of Hokutai-Sandepu, for it was conceived and carried out without determination, without unity, and naturally was foredoomed to failure, against an enemy of the sticking powers of the Japanese. Had the enemy been less staunch, and the advance much more rapid and determined, it might have succeeded, but it was not of the kind that can possibly succeed in modern war.

"The Japanese acted differently, for, far from sitting down to a passive defence, as soon as they were attacked, they reinforced their left, and assumed the offensive themselves. They seem to have put in altogether three or four Divisions, but the distances were so great, that not all the men of these took much part. Had the Russians continued a day longer in the positions they had gained, without moving in the rest of the field, they would have been outmatched on their right, and probably had their right wing destroyed. Fortunately for themselves, they retired in time, though it would have been better for them had they fought in a determined way all along their line."

## CHAPTER X.

### THE BATTLE OF MUKDEN.

THE position from the middle of February was :—

*Russians.*—Second Army, Mixed Rifle Corps, right bank of Hunho about Shantan. Their right was covered about Syfantai by three regiments of Cavalry (the Caucasian Mounted Brigade and the First Verchvendinski Cossacks), with one or two batteries. On the left bank of the Hunho the VIII. Corps continued the line with the X. left of them as far as the entrenched position on the Shaho, the right wing of which reached on just west of Linshinpu.

The I. Siberian Corps, that had suffered far the most at the battle of Sandepu, lay as reserve to the 2nd Army at Maturan.

General Kaulbars had relieved Grippenbergh in command of this Army, while Bilderling took command of the 3rd Army as Senior Corps Commander. The 3rd Army occupied the entrenched front, with part of the V. Siberian, XVII. European, and VI. Siberian Corps, from eastwards of Linchinpu to about the Novgorod basin.

Eastwards lay Linievitch with the I. European and the IV., II., and III. Siberian Corps widely extended in the highlands from westwards of Orrdagou to northwards of the Kautulin Passes.

As General Reserve stood the newly arrived XVI. Army Corps in the neighbourhood of Baitapu. Strong Cavalry, commanded by Rennenkampf since Mistchenko had been wounded, lay still further east, and in the first half of February advanced as far as the heights of Liauyang. Detachments under Alexieff held the Passes of Sinhotschonn and Sinking. These detachments, excluding cavalry, were the whole 71st Reserve Division, with part of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division (from the III. Siberian Corps) at Sinhotschonn, and about eight Battalions and several Sotnias at Sinking. Their outposts were pushed out far to the front, as far as near Kiantshang.

*Japanese.*—First Army (Kuroki) outposts from southwards, Fyndiapu facing north-east over Shanpintaitse to the neighbourhood of Benzihu. Left lay in connection the 4th Army (Nodzu) to southward of the Putiloff hill, next the 2nd Army from the Mandarin Road over Lamutun and just south of Linschinpu to about Lidiantun.

Sandepu and Hokutai were strongly held.

The Japanese therefore lay facing the Russians in the form of a bent bow.

The extraordinary front occupied, that of the Russians over fifty-five miles, balanced, however, the slight drawing back of the wings.

Since the fall of Port Arthur, Japanese reinforcements were crowding up behind both wings.

In the east three Reserve Divisions had come up in December or early January, and were forming, with

## 100 RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR ON LAND.

the 11th Active Division from Port Arthur, the 5th Army under Kawamura.

In the West the 3rd Army, 1st, 7th, and 9th Divisions, was collecting about Liaobeiho.

The Japanese Army was formed as follows:—

(Kuroki) ... 1st Army, Guards, 2nd and 12th Divisions.

(Kawamura) ... 5th Army, 11th and three Reserve.

(Nodzu) ... 4th Army, 5th and 10th and one Reserve Division.

(Oku) ... ... 2nd Army, 4th, 3rd, 6th Divisions.

(Nogi) ... ... 3rd Army, 1st, 7th, 9th, one Reserve Division.

General Reserve, 3rd, and two Reserve Divisions.

This makes the opposing sides in the middle of February.

### *Russians.*

I., II., III., IV., V., VI. Siberian Corps.

X., VIII., XVII., I. Army Corps.

61st Reserve Division.

1st, 2nd, 5th European Rifle Brigades.

Four Cavalry Divisions.

Total,  $22\frac{1}{2}$  Infantry and four Cavalry Divisions, with a strength of 415,000 men. Allowing 15 per

cent. for sickness, &c., and then we have to hand 350,000 men.

*Japanese.*

- 13 Active Divisions.
- 7 Reserve Divisions.
- 2 Cavalry Brigades.
- 3 Artillery Brigades.

The Japanese had endeavoured in every way to increase the strength of companies during the winter rather than form new forces with inferior organisation.

They had apparently an average of 280 men per company instead of 250, some companies being even 300 strong.

In the middle of February an Active Division must therefore have been at least 16,000 men and a Reserve Division 12,000.

This gives a total for the battle of Mukden of 300,000 to 310,000 men.

Strategically the fall of Port Arthur had removed any necessity for the Russians to take offensive action. The enemy was known now to have the whole of his force in line that he possibly could get there, and the result of the actions of the Shaho and Sandepu had shown that without further reinforcements there was no chance of success for the Russians if they attacked. These reinforcements were coming, and 60,000 men of the 3rd and 4th Rifle Divisions and the IV. Army Corps would arrive by the end of March.

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The Russians might then, as they had waited so long, have waited for these reinforcements.

On the Japanese side it was different; they could get but few more reinforcements, and therefore obviously should try for a tactical victory.

Mukden has been stated to have been so important a political point to the Russians that they had to defend it and fight a decisive action before giving it up.

This, if it were true, which it probably is not, is only another instance of the difficulty of harmonising political exigencies with correct strategy. In the words of Löffler :—

“Delay was much to the Russians still. Had they retired on Harbin, they were retiring on reinforcements and making more difficulties for the Japanese.

“As a matter of fact the Russians probably recognised this fact, but thought themselves strong enough, as indeed they should have been, to hold their position.

“But, as was the case in all their tactical dispositions, there never seemed to have been a complete, determined and careful disposition of their forces with a view to defence and counter-attack with reference to the whole position. Parts of the position, taken alone, were skilfully defended, but as a general whole there does not seem to have been a proper system or thought-out scheme. Is it that Kuropatkin and his staff were so occupied with the organisation of the Army, and the lines of communication, and in

answering correspondence from Russia, and combating political and civilian interference from home, that they had no time to consider any thought-out and reasoned plans beyond the main strategical problems?"

Already by the middle of February Linievitch on the left flank was reporting the activity of the Japanese right, which was being constantly reinforced.

On the 23rd February the Japanese attacked Sinhoshon, and about mid-day the Russians, who were in inferior force, began to retire by the Dalin Pass.

Apparently the Russians at Sinking were not attacked.

Alexieff has been blamed for the loss of Sinhoshon, but why it is difficult to understand. Rennenkampf was now placed in charge of the whole left flank detachment.

On the 25th February the Japanese advanced on the Dalin Pass. The Russians remained at Sanlunyui. Meanwhile, further westwards, the Japanese were advancing. On the 23rd the Russians held fast on the roads through Shauhuantsai and Payidi, about five miles from the main position.

The advance in the east gave the appearance that it was the Japanese intention to press the Russian left wing, until they were forced to weaken their right and centre, and then attack them by the right. But this appearance is not necessarily the correct solution of the Japanese Staff's intention, for, as a

matter of fact, the Japanese well knew that the whole Russian front was so drawn out that it was weak everywhere.

However, Kuropatkin withdrew the I. Siberian Corps from the right wing to the left again.

On the Russian right until the 27th there was no alteration, only far away to the rear two squadrons of Japanese Cavalry destroyed a bridge near Guntshuling. On this Kuropatkin reinforced this line of communication troops by a Brigade of the 41st Division (XVI. Corps) and strong Cavalry. This is clear proof how much he looked to his line of retreat, and allowed his movements to depend on the movements of his enemy.

On the 26th the I. Siberian Corps reached Sansamutun, and next day continued its march eastwards, followed by the 72nd Infantry Division of the 6th Siberian Corps.

Meanwhile, the Japanese were still advancing. The Russians at Sanlunyui were attacked in front and both flanks, and Kuroki commenced an attack on the Passes of Kautulin and Vansulin, and on Bianyupusa, and the advanced posts southwards at Findiapu. Nodzu (4th Army) shelled the whole front of the Shaho, and particularly the hill of Putiloff and Novgorod with high explosive shell, but did not dislodge the Russian Infantry. There does not seem to have been a serious Infantry attack. On the 27th and 28th there was very severe fighting at various points along the whole front, and in the far east the



Russians, who had been reinforced, apparently fairly strongly, held their ground at Kudiatsy.

It is noteworthy that on the far eastern portion of the line the Russians, consisting of at most a Reserve Division with three to four Regiments as reinforcements, were attacked by four Japanese Divisions. Three of these, however, were Reserve Divisions, and the fact that they did not make more progress is proof that the Reserve Divisions were not such good material as the Active Divisions.

On the next day—March 1st—the advance of the Japanese left (Third Army : Nogi) between the rivers Hunho and Liaoho was most marked. Kuropatkin was aware by the 26th February that Nogi, with three Active and one Reserve Divisions, was close behind the Japanese left, and reported on the 28th their arrival at Kaliaama on the Liaoho River. On the 1st March the Japanese drove in the Russian Cavalry at Syfantai, and attacked the mixed Rifle Corps at Shantan, and northwards. They also on this day crossed the Hunho towards Shantan.

It appears that part of the Second Army (Oku), whose main strength lay between the Shaho and the Hunho Rivers, crossed the Hunho to support Nogi on this day.

In the course of the next day the 8th Division and the greater part of the 5th certainly, were on the western bank in support of the Third Army. The Russians held their ground on the 1st, but some Japanese Cavalry, probably supported by some

battalions, appeared at Sinmuntun and drove the Russian Cavalry from there and also from Tamintun.

In consequence the 1st Brigade 41st Infantry Division (XVI. Army Corps) was ordered from Baitapu through Mukden on to the main road to Sinmuntun.

The rest of the XVI. Corps on the spot, *i.e.*, the 25th Division, with a mixed Division of the X. Corps, were ordered to cross the Hunho south-west of Mukden, and, advancing towards Salinpu, prevent the further advance of the Japanese northwards of the Hunho River.

The I. Siberian Corps, one regiment of which certainly had been engaged on the eastern extreme wing, was ordered to again countermarch, and was just west of Mukden in the course of the 3rd of March. The V. and XVII. Corps, that had not been seriously engaged, each supplied a composite Division for a Reserve, placed at Mukden, and the I. Corps sent one Regiment, the 147th, to join the composite Division of the XVII. Corps. The mixed Rifle Corps had to withdraw over the Hunho on to the VIII. Corps, which, with part of the X. Corps, held off the Japanese on the south.

It is not to be wondered at that the mixed Rifle Corps could not hold on, and the natural result of their retirement was a dislocation of the line of defence.

During the 2nd and 3rd a new line was formed by the Russians about Tachichao, on the Sinmuntun

Road, and through Shandiasa, Shansintun, Yeltaisa, connecting with the defensive front about Linshinpu.

Naturally the new line was not taken up as deliberately as if there were quiet along the front.

There was not much general fighting on the 2nd and 3rd, comparatively speaking. On the right bank of the Hunho the Japanese attained Paitsytai, Salinpu, and just northwards of the latter place. Some Infantry attacks on the Putiloff hill were unsuccessful.

Eastwards, the II. Siberian Corps succeeded in repulsing, after a bloody fight, an attack of the Japanese Guard. On the Kautulin Pass several counter-attacks were attempted by the Russians.

On the 3rd the 1st Brigade of the 41st Infantry Division, which had found no enemy at Sinmuntun, countermarched to Mukden. They were caught by some Japanese detachments, and attacked from the west and south-west, and driven, with severe losses, headlong north-eastwards. They even lost touch with the main army for some days.

By mid-day on the 2nd the 25th Infantry Division had advanced as far as Shandiasa, the composite Division of the X. Corps to Shansintun, while during the night the VIII. Corps advanced as far as the Hunho. Nogi therefore held his left in on the 3rd, and by mid-day had succeeded in driving back the 25th Infantry Division to their entrenchments.

In the evening the line south of the Hunho, however, about Fuhudiapu, was still in Russian hands.

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The morning of the 4th March found the Russians, therefore, in the following positions on the west front:—

1st Brigade, 41st Division, driven north of the road to Sinmuntun. Strong cavalry detachments, apparently commanded by no one in particular, were north-east of Tamintun.

Some reinforcements had been ordered from Mukden to join the 41st Division, wherever they were.

On the line from Hata to Tawun were a part of the 35th Infantry Division (XVII. Corps); behind them, between Huanguatun and the railway, half the 31st Division (V. Corps).

The entrenchments from Niusiantun to Yahuntun were held by the severely shaken 25th Division. Further south at Shansintun were half the 9th Infantry Division (X. Corps), and close to them the VIII. Corps. South of Mukden Station, on both sides of the railway, the I. Siberian Corps were in position. That is to say, that on this west front lay from  $5\frac{1}{2}$  to 6 Russian Divisions,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  of which were almost useless, so badly mauled had they been; and at the very least 5 Japanese strong Divisions, well in hand, and flushed with victory, opposed them. The Russians too were only hastily aligned. On the 3rd March it was fairly quiet on the south front.

Kuropatkin proposed to make a counter-attack on the 4th with his troops in the west, but they were not equal to it. In fact, on the 4th the Second Army completed their passage of the river, and on

the 5th the Second and Third Japanese Armies made a general attack on both sides of the Hunho and Sinnmintun Road.

The 8th Division on the left of the Second Army directed their attack on Yansitun, the 5th Division on Madiapu and Sutopa, close to the Hunho.

The 4th Division, further south, aided the Fourth Army, which made with all their force an attack on the entrenched front, particularly the western part.

The Japanese line, by evening, was from Linchinpu by a line just past Paidiantsu-Tasudiapu to the Hunho west of Yeltaisa.

Only on the extreme left the Japanese made much ground, reaching there the neighbourhood of Schuanwentiao.\* And even further north Japanese Cavalry was in touch with the 1st Brigade, 41st Division, and the Russian Cavalry.

On the Russian side, in the course of the 4th, some more troops of the mixed Rifle Corps arrived and reinforced; the 9th Regiment indeed, of the 3rd Rifle Brigade, actually marched from its disembarkation platform directly into the fight, like the Wyborg Regiment at Liauyang.

For a counter-attack on the 5th Kuropatkin had given the following orders:—

A right column, consisting of the I. Siberian Corps, supported by a brigade from the X. Corps and one from the XVII., and some Battalions from the

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\* Not marked on map.

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I. Army Corps, to collect and advance at 8 a.m. on Diakiu-Yandiatur.

A centre column, 25th Infantry Division, with some troops in support, to advance on Shandiasa-Shansintun when the right column reached the line Diakiu-Yandiatur.

A left column, formed of the VIII. Corps, 3 Infantry Regiments, X. Corps,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  Brigade Rifle Corps, were ordered to attack between Shansintun and the Hunho at the same time as the centre column.

The orders, indeed, were for an attack in echelon, as that at the battle of Sandepu; but dissected, it appears to be a simple frontal advance. The curious jumbling of units is noteworthy. It was probably on this account that the I. Siberian Corps were not ready by 8 a.m., and the Japanese advanced themselves. So, as far as one can ascertain from Japanese accounts, it was not till the 6th that Kuropatkin's great counter-blow commenced, and it was a failure. Indeed, it had come to a halt by mid-day. Zerpitzki with the left column failed too, like Stakelberg. The 6th and 7th passed west of Mukden in this backward and forward fighting, while the Japanese extended further and further northwards, and thus began to lose proper touch between armies, and even divisions. Indeed, the Second Army began to find itself in a critical situation, for the Third Army was pushing further and further north, and its own attacks gained but little ground. The 5th Division, which belonged to the Army Reserve, was put into the gap.

Thoroughly comprehending the situation, Oku not only made his hardly treated 4th Division hold their ground, but made a most vigorous movement on the 9th with the 8th Division towards the north, thereby relieving the strain on the Third Army far better than by closing back on to it.

The fight westwards of Mukden during the 9th showed a gradual encircling of the Russians by the Japanese, while on both sides the last man was put in.

The Russian Corps were terribly mixed up with one another, and even Divisions, Brigades, and Regiments were hopelessly confused.

It is difficult to find out what exactly there were in this part of the field, but the Russians had apparently three-quarters of the X., the VIII., half the XVII., half the Rifle Corps, and the I. Siberian Corps; they also probably had some troops from the I. Army Corps, and some few men from the XVI. Corps. In all, perhaps, 10 or 11 Divisions; but the divisions were much weakened, and one can probably estimate that there were not more than 85,000 men available on this wing, and perhaps 350 guns.

The Japanese had the 1st, 7th, 9th, <sup>1st Reserve</sup>~~1st Reserves~~; 5th, 8th, 3rd, half the 4th, and probably 1½ Reserve Divisions from the Army Reserve.

With every allowance for losses, we may probably set these down as 120,000 men, with perhaps 350 guns.

More and more the balance turned to the Japanese,

not by any definite success, but by the general weakening and confusion of the Russians.

Particularly on the extreme left, on the Sinmuntun road the Japanese were pushing on, while south of the Hunho, where only weak forces now opposed them, they gained ground, and reached at last the railway and the old railway embankment from Surantun.

By the 8th March the resisting power of the Russians north of the Hunho began to fail. Portions of troops from the south and east wing were brought over and thrown into the fight anywhere as the moment demanded. By the morning of the 9th the Japanese reached Santaitse, while some time on the 9th the cavalry destroyed the line north of Mukden.

By this time the Russians, south of the Hunho, were in full retreat.

The Japanese attacks on the Shaho position had, it is true, been a failure, but Kuropatkin had to keep drawing men from his east and south front to reinforce the west, so that no counter-attack of any strength was possible, and the whole line withdrew over the Hunho, the ground south of which was in Japanese hands by the 9th.

Kuropatkin intended to make a determined stand on a line from Fushan to Mukden, but such a line would have required 150,000 men, or seven Army Corps, and where were these to come from? Besides, they would have first had to reorganise their intercommunications, and this, with the Japanese



advanced guard hard upon their heels as they crossed the river.

The truth is that the retiring east and south fronts could only form a rearguard.

The Japanese pushed steadily on; on the 9th they reached Kinsan, on the night 9th-10th, Fushan, on the morning of the 10th Hata and Mukden, without any severe fighting.

The defeat was no Napoleonic one, no complete dislocation of the component parts of the force. There was no breaking through the line of defence, and driving the defeated force in hopeless ruin from the field. The defeated Russians retired from their Shaho position over a difficult river, the Hunho, without any serious losses, and Kuropatkin could even with some semblance of truth pretend that his was a strategic retirement.

From the 5th March the baggage had been retiring on Tieling.

However, on the Russian right the fearful confusion that the fight had caused led to a disorganised retirement.

The general retirement of the Russians continued on the 9th.

On the 10th the Japanese advanced troops seized the Pass of Vangadalin, on the main road from Mukden to Tielin, and reached the village of Puho.

On the night of the 11th some Russian detachments under Gerschelmann were surrounded, and forced to surrender.

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There cannot, however, be said to have been a pursuit in the sense of pressing a beaten foe until he loses all cohesion, and his retirement degenerates into a *saue qui peut*, such as that of the Prussians after Jena and Auerstadt, the French after Vittoria and Waterloo, or the Austrians after Koniggratz.

So tired out by the fighting were the Japanese, that, though a few advanced troops followed close on the heels of the Russians, the main body only advanced slowly. In the early hours of the morning of the 14th, the Japanese were engaged on the Fanho, south-west of Tieling.

The main headquarters remained at Gunshuling. On the night of 16th-17th March the Japanese occupied Tieling, and on the 19th Kaiyuan. By this time they were quite worn out, and when their advanced troops reached the line from Peiuanpumen to Tchantufu and westward they could get no further.

From the 23rd a new standstill, only broken by unimportant outpost and patrol skirmishing, fell upon the theatre of war.

The Russians were stated to have lost 56,000 wounded removed to the rear, and 26,000 dead and wounded, and 45,000-50,000 prisoners left on the field, in all nearly 30 per cent. of their strength.

Later official reports put the losses at two generals, 1,983 officers, 87,677 men. Which total is correct we do not know.

The Japanese captured thirty-two heavy guns, howitzers and mortars, twenty-six quick firers, and a few old pattern field guns, and two colours, besides a great quantity of waggons, stores, and rations.

Seeing that the Russians are known to have placed a large number of heavy guns—estimated by one source at 280, and by another at 190, but at any rate more than 150 in the south front—in carefully prepared emplacements, the fact that only thirty-two were captured, and some of those damaged, is proof sufficient, if proof were needed, that the retreat of the south and east fronts was quite orderly, commenced some days before the positions were evacuated.

The Japanese losses were nearly 50,000.

Like almost every battle of the campaign, the Russians allowed their movements to be dictated to them by their enemy. The one general knew what he wanted, and, regardless of losses, and with complete trust in himself and his army, tried to do it, and succeeded.

On the other side there was no cohesion, no system, no knowledge of what was required, no determination to succeed at all costs.


Here and there were isolated attempts at energy, isolated gallant counter-strokes, but of general plan and organization there seems to have been none.

A passive defence will never achieve victory; and if the defence desires, as it must, to change from passivity to activity, the means to this end must be

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sought for in the arrangements prior to the action. They cannot be improvised.

For instance, the 16th Corps was so disposed as to be not a reserve to the army, but a support to the south front. Naturally, part was soon drawn into the line there. Again, a weak Japanese force destroyed the line north of Mukden, and immediately strong reinforcements for the communications are despatched, detached from the hard-pressed line. Then more of the Reserve is put into the right wing, and thus when the right wing is finally driven back, Kuropatkin finds himself without fresh troops



to build his new line of resistance on. He then brings odds and ends of troops out of his centre and left, and puts them confusedly into his right. No wonder that there is no cohesion, no resisting power in his right wing.

As a general criticism, one may say that the Russians occupied an impossibly long line, that as a consequence they had to put so many troops into the firing line and its immediate supports that they had no Army Reserves and no Grand Reserve. Reserves can only be used before the battle-field has been left, so they must not be kept too far back, and must be used, not left like Bazaine's Reserve at Metz. But they must not be so close up as only to be supports to the firing line.

The fact is that, to copy a celebrated writer of the day, and be guilty of a paradox, one may say that the Reserve of the Defence is an attacking force, the Reserve of the Attack a defensive force.

That is to say, that when the attack is pressing so hard that the defence is in danger, the vigorous counter-attack of the Reserve will drive the attack back, and gain the defence time to re-establish itself. While on the other hand the attacker, subject to this counter-blow, will ward it off by using his reserve.

At Liauyang Kuropatkin used his reserve to retire through. At Mukden he did not have one worthy of the name at all, and what he had he frittered away to no purpose.

Löffler says: "Let us imagine what would have happened had Kuropatkin held two corps in reserve, say at Puho.

"On the evening of the 3rd, when the Japanese were committed to their attack on the Russian right, these two corps would have marched to the support, making in a south-west direction, and then, striking the Japanese left as it circled round the Russians on the 6th and 7th, have probably driven it in disorder across the Tanho, and perhaps away from the railway.

"It is needless to say, however, that the Japanese knew there was no such reserve, and made their dispositions accordingly.

"It is a question whether the tactics of the Japanese in attacking both wings were correct. The mountains in the east favoured an energetic defence with comparatively small numbers, and, perhaps, Kuroki reinforced by, say, one Reserve Division could have sufficed to keep the Russian left occupied, while Kawamura, as a general Reserve, would have been thrown into the fight with fresh troops on the 6th between Oku and Nogi, allowing Nogi to cut the Russian communications entirely. It is a question whether in that case anything of the Russian host except, perhaps, some of Linievitch's and Rennen-kampf's Corps, could have withdrawn."

Incidentally, the astonishing value of the part which a force of, say, 20,000 mounted infantry, would have played in the fight is noticeable. The original

movement on the right would have been made with them, and then they would have rapidly changed flanks, and, moving even further north than the 8th Division, have blocked the Russian escape.

Kuropatkin was replaced in the command by Linievitch on the 17th March, but returned for a short time and took command of the First Army.

Both armies took up defensive positions, and the Russians were still further reinforced. The 3rd and 4th Rifle Brigades arrived, and the whole five Rifle Brigades were increased to the footing of Divisions.

The IV. Army Corps was sent to the Far East.

The mobilization of four more corps commenced, the XIX., IX., XIII., XXI., and by the 10th August the XIX. Corps was already arriving.

By the end of September the Russians would have had 60,000 men in Vladivostok, and 600,000 men on the theatre of war besides.

The Japanese meanwhile strained every nerve to reinforce their Field Army, but by the end of September they could not possibly have collected more than 350,000 men to oppose the Russians, who could certainly have had available for field operations 500,000.

On the 27th May, in a battle in the Straits of Tsuchima, Admiral Togo annihilated the Russian Baltic Fleet under Rozdestvensky.

During July and August certain minor operations took place in the island of Sakhalin, in which the Japanese were uniformly successful; there were also

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occasional brushes between the outpost lines, and the Russians and Japanese detached troops in North Korea, but these are of small importance.

That the Japanese would have been eventually driven back had the war continued is just possible; that they could have advanced further quite impossible, but the Russian bolt was shot. Internal disorders at home, and constant failure in the field, had weakened their credit almost to breaking point, while the Japanese also began to realise that the drain in their resources would soon become unendurable.

Mr. Roosevelt, President of the United States, invited the Czar and the Mikado to send peace plenipotentiaries to America, to discuss a possible basis for peace; the proposal was accepted, and on the 5th September peace was eventually signed.

By the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan secured all the advantages for which she had fought, except that only half the island of Sakhalin was ceded back to her, while Russia gained time to endeavour to heal the disorder at home.

The war was in a way unique, for it was a long-drawn-out fight between two powers in the territory of a neutral. Except Sakhalin, the Japanese never entered real Russian territory, for Port Arthur was only leased to her. There have been somewhat similar cases, such as the Peninsular War and the Waterloo Campaign, but in both cases the Armies of the victors finally marched into Paris, the heart of the



vanquished country's territory. Of marching to Moscow there could be no thought in this war.

Having now recounted generally the principal strategical and major tactical movements, there remains only to collect a few of the lessons that have been adduced by various writers, from the campaign.

## CHAPTER XI.

### SOME LESSONS OF THE WAR.

BEFORE commencing to enumerate some of the lessons to be deduced from the war, it may be as well to mention that, in spite of the statements occasionally published, the customs of war usually observed between two civilised powers were rigidly observed by both sides in Manchuria. There seems to be no doubt but that, with the exception of our own conduct of the war against the Boers, there has never been a campaign conducted, in which the principles of humanity have been more rigidly observed by any nation than by both sides in the late war.

At present the data to establish the number of the killed and wounded, sick and missing, on either side are quite incomplete; but it would seem that while the Russian Medical Staff was much overtaxed, and this the more on account of the gross neglect of hygienic principles by officers, whether staff or regimental, and men, the Japanese Medical Staff was entirely adequate and managed in such a way as to excite general admiration. The Japanese soldier is naturally clean, and was animated by so extraordinary a patriotism, that when he had once understood the principles of hygiene on which his health depended, he observed them rigidly, without

supervision, in order that he might not unfit himself to take part in the struggle in the field.

The consequences of this difference between the two armies was, that whereas often nearly 15 per cent. of the Russian force was hors de combat on account of sickness, on the Japanese side rarely 1 per cent. was incapacitated from this cause.

On both sides the soldiers each carried a portion of a bivouac tent, but whereas the Russian soldier was made to carry throughout the campaign a cumbersome and often temporarily unnecessary kit, better arrangements were made by the Japanese.

Ordinarily, both sides marched carrying their knapsack and equipment, but when going into action the Japanese soldier discarded his knapsack and went into the fight with a rolled cloak over his left shoulder and a cloth bag over his right, in which were rations for perhaps two or three days, and about 200 extra rounds of ammunition, bringing the total amount of ammunition with which he entered the fight up to about 350 rounds. With a spare pair of socks and a piece of soap in his haversack, he was able to get along for several days in this way until after the engagement was over his knapsack and kit were brought up by the transport.

It would appear difficult to devise a more satisfactory arrangement, but it must not be forgotten that in the long marches incident to the campaign, and common to any campaign, the Japanese soldier

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carried his pack, in order not to increase the already burdensome weight of transport dragging at the tail of the marching columns.

The Russian soldier received a ration of rye bread and meat, and vegetables were sometimes issued, sometimes to be obtained in the country. Each Russian Company is provided with a field kitchen on wheels. This excellent and simple contrivance enables a meal to be cooked while the troops are actually in motion. It is recorded that there was never a road so bad, or a march so long, but that the travelling field kitchen could keep up. This arrangement appears difficult to excel.

The Japanese soldier can live for days on rice, and this undoubtedly helped the commissariat arrangements of the army wonderfully. No European troops, however, could march and fight on such a diet. His ordinary ration consisted of rice, fresh meat or dried fish, vegetables, oil, and sometimes spirits in the form of saké.

The Russian is a splendid horsemaster, and treats his animals with kindness, in marked contrast to the Japanese, who is said to be an execrable horsemaster, and to have literally no knowledge of horses. As the horse is a but little used beast in Japan, this is not to be wondered at.

The Japanese Supply and Transport Services have been already referred to. In more detail it may be said that each division was self-contained, and had in addition to the regimental or 1st Line Transport,

a Train, One Battalion; Stretcher Bearers, One Battalion; Ammunition Supply, One Battalion.

The former two battalions are kept at skeleton strength during peace time, and instruct four batches of recruits as drivers every year, thus building up a very large reserve force. This train is under a special intendant officer. The Ammunition Supply Battalion is formed in a similar way, and is under the officer commanding the artillery.

The Stretcher Bearers are formed of reserve soldiers under combatant officers, and a medical staff is attached. The Field Hospitals are formed under the train officers as far as transport goes.

The system of training drivers for the train duties was found to work well on the whole, but the Japanese transport cart was very bad, and had to be largely replaced by purchased Chinese vehicles.

Behind the Divisions was the Army Supply arranged by *etappen* or stages. That is, great depots were formed and pushed up towards the fighting columns, and from these depots the Divisional Transport refilled.

Of especial interest to ourselves is any information that can be obtained about the Japanese Sea Transport and methods employed and times taken to embark and disembark the men, horses, guns, waggons, and stores.

The voyage was a short one, four days at the outside, so that elaborate preparations had not to be

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made, but it may be remarked here parenthetically, that still slighter preparation of the ships need be made for the transport of troops for a trip only twenty-four hours or less, such as from Germany or France, to England.

The transports employed by the Japanese were almost entirely Japanese vessels, generally commanded by an English Captain with a Scotch Chief Engineer, and varied in size from 6,000 to 2,500 tons.

The horse stalls were of the roughest description, merely rough planks and boards nailed together, which could be, and were, put up in a few hours by ordinary carpenters.

Guns, waggons and stores were carried in the hold and shipped in the ordinary way. The horses were generally slung on board with the ship's steam derricks.

It appears that on a 6,000 ton ship from 1,200 to 3,000 men and 250 to 300 horses would be taken.

As far as possible a unit would ship complete. Thus a transport would take a Battalion and a Battery with all the 1st Line Transport, besides supplies.

The troops were disembarked in sampans carried by the Transports. These sampans are large flat-bottomed barges, about thirty feet long and nine feet beam, drawing six inches of water when loaded. Each sampan had its gear complete, and special davits had to be rigged to carry them.

A sampan would take from thirty to forty men each, or from four to six horses.

A few lighters were also towed by the Transports when going to a new debarkation point. If it was intended to continue using the point for debarkation of Troops, the lighters would be left. These lighters would take 100 men or fifteen horses.

The horses were slung out and the men went out by gangways. The horses all had grass shoes, which prevented slipping while on board or during embarkation or disembarkation.

It was found that with practice a ship could clear itself of men in three to four hours. Were the roadstead sufficiently large, it is evident that any number of Troops, for which Transports could be provided, could land on an open shore in this time. The landing of supplies and stores would obviously be a longer matter.

In the sap work in front of Port Arthur and in the Russian defences, bullet-proof shields of about a square foot superficies were extensively employed. For the purpose of destroying entanglements and obstacles, it has been suggested, both by Continental and English writers, that some sort of portable shield would be invaluable. Such a shield must be easily portable, and the volunteers for obstacle destroying would take them on from the final position from which the assault was to be delivered.

Grenades, both hand and rolling, were extensively employed by both sides in front of Port Arthur.

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The Russian electric land mines proved practically ineffective, though naturally nerve destroying, and therefore valuable to some extent as tending to upset the morale of the attackers.

The Japanese used in their advanced trenches small wooden mortars of five-inch calibre. They fired explosive and incendiary grenades of about  $4\frac{1}{2}$  lbs. weight with the fuse. Various driving charges were used to give a more or less extensive range, the maximum being about 300 yards.

It is said that they also had a seven-inch wooden mortar, though details as to its range and capacity are unobtainable.

The engineering work on both sides was remarkable for its excellence; the bridges were sometimes pontoon, but generally trestle bridges. That over the Hunho River at Mukden for instance was a quarter of a mile long and ten feet wide. It was built of wooden trestles, secured by wire hawsers. The Russian field works were of the most elaborate kind, every device being utilised to make them secure. They generally consisted of three lines, the Outpost Line, the First Line of Resistance, and the Second Line. In the outpost line deep trenches, like those constructed by the Boers at Magersfontein, and rifle pits were used. In the other lines, redoubts of strong profile, connected by trenches and covered by entanglements, abattis, trous de loup and other obstacles, were constructed. During the latter phases of the war,



the attacking force entrenched itself as it advanced, and to do this almost every man carried an entrenching tool of some sort. In a Japanese Company two-thirds of the men had such a tool.

Behind the great lines that were constructed, bombproof shelters for the supports and reserve were made, which served as huts for the men to live in, and a light railway provided intercommunication.

On both sides, the endurance shown by the rank and file was most remarkable. It has been said that the greatest military virtue is to cheerfully endure and show courage under the stress of extreme fatigue, and this virtue both sides displayed in a marked degree; this characteristic was most noticeable in the Russian troops, which disheartened as they must have been by constant defeat and retirement, and without any real enthusiasm in the quarrel, nevertheless showed a good front always, and never lost their morale to any dangerous extent.

This brings us naturally to the characteristic of the Campaign that has perhaps been most talked about in Continental Military Circles, and that is the fact that no battle of the Campaign ended in a long sustained general pursuit.

Nothing could have exceeded the crushing nature of the defeats at the battles of Yalu and Telissu, yet neither ended in disaster to the Russians. After the Yalu, a couple of battalions and a battery were cut up, and after Telissu the fire action of a Brigade of Cavalry caused some loss to the Russians,

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but generally speaking the rearguards were able to hold the enemy at arm's length.

At Mukden it is true that the Russian right was overwhelmed, but no attempt was apparently made to pursue and destroy the remains of the beaten Russian Army.

It may be that this must be put down to the fatigue consequent on several days of protracted fighting, or to lack of sufficient mounted troops, or to the caution which marked the Japanese movements from first to last. Probably the fact must be put to the credit of all three reasons.

On the Russian side the ordinary tactical procedure was to occupy and strongly entrench a position, and after holding it passively till dark to retire to another one further back under cover of night. In the scheme for the occupation of their positions, the idea of, and the careful preparation for, a grand counter-attack was always lost sight of. Such tactics could not lead to victory; they might help to gain time, but to help towards the grand object of war, the destruction of the enemy, they were of little real value.

Marches and advances were constantly made by night by both sides, and this aspect of modern war must not on any account be lost sight of. Towards the end of our Boer War, marches were constantly made by night, but advances to attack a position under cover of night have never been resorted to with such frequency in any previous campaign as in

this one by the Japanese, both in Manchuria and before Port Arthur. In Chapter IV., the Japanese strategy up to the time of the Battle of Liauyang was considered, and the criticism, voiced by Löffler, which has been generally adverse to the Japanese, was explained. The mistake was over-caution, but for my own part, I do not think that the critics of the Japanese strategy have given enough prominence to the fact that the Japanese are an Asiatic people, and that for centuries every meeting between Europeans and Asiatics has resulted in the discomfiture of the latter, however great the numerical odds in their favour. It must have been of inconceivable importance to the morale of the Japanese Army that there should be no defeat, or even repulse in the early part of the war.

There is, however, one point in which the Japanese General Staff must be blamed, and that is the way in which the 7th and 8th Divisions were retained at home until October. There is no more certain maxim of strategy than that for a decisive battle every man and every gun should be brought into the line. It is no excuse to say that the communications were insufficient to provide for them. If they were not at Liauyang, then they should have been in front of Port Arthur, to ensure that as soon as possible the Field Troops detained by the fortress should be set free by its capture to join the Field Army.

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Many a blunder has been made by the British, particularly during the time of the Napoleonic Wars, in this way. But the Japanese constitution admits of military affairs being managed by trained strategists, not as in our case, by more or less distinguished politicians; and there seems to be no doubt that it was the fault of the General Staff that these two fine Divisions were made to kick their heels in idleness in Japan, instead of taking their places in the line.

An extra division in Marshal Oyama's Reserve at Liauyang might, if thrown fresh into the fight of September the 2nd, have overwhelmed the rear-guards, and converted a retreat into a disaster.

Of the Russian strategy there is not much to say. To fight on the Yalu and at Telissu were strategical blunders, apparently forced on Kuropatkin by Alexieff or St. Petersburg.

The force necessary to overcome the Japanese was ridiculously under-estimated; six Army Corps and two Cavalry Divisions, besides Lines of Communication Troops, proved so inadequate, that when peace was signed, notwithstanding the heavy losses of the Campaign, fourteen Army Corps and six Cavalry Divisions were at the seat of war, besides the Garrison and Lines of Communication Troops, and two more Army Corps were on their way, and two more mobilising. That is to say that Russia had recognised the necessity of employing not six but eighteen Army Corps.

General Kuropatkin's strategy was probably otherwise, though not brilliant, yet correct, until the time came to join battle, then, though at and after Liauyang he always outnumbered his opponent, yet Oyama always managed to collect a superiority of force at the decisive points.

Reference to the fact that the Russian tactics never contemplated a counter-attack has already been made; it was the same with the Russian strategy. Glued to the knowledge that time would give him great superiority of force, Kuropatkin constantly fell back to meet his reinforcements.

That Liauyang may have been too advanced a place to choose for the first decisive battle is not the point; it may have been so, or it may not. The fact remains that the Russian strategy, like their tactics, was dictated to them by the Japanese.

General Negrier says, "The Russo-Japanese War has shown again that it is offensive strategy alone that gains the day. An army obliged, by political consideration, or inferiority of number, to remain on the defensive, must defend itself by constant counter-attacks. It was thus in 1814, which will for ever remain the model for such strategy."

"Napoleon, while he manœuvred between the allied armies, always acted on the offensive. His numerical inferiority never was allowed to force him to take up a position. Bar-Sur-Aube, Craonne, Laon, Rheims, Saint Dizier, were all offensive actions."

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Before leaving the questions of strategy, it should be pointed out that the Press Correspondents and Military Attachés were put into quite a new position by both sides, but particularly by the Japanese. We have had a lesson in the proper way to treat the Press Correspondent, and it is to be devoutly hoped that the lesson will be learnt by us, and that he will be relegated to his proper place in the scheme of military creation, should we again become involved in a great war, or even a little one like the Boer War, in which the publication of news and ignorant criticism can do great injury to ourselves.

The failure of the Cossack Cavalry has been remarked upon in Chapter IV. The Japanese Service of Security is thus well described in a French report dated from Liauyang, July, 1904: "Mixed detachments of strength varying from twenty to forty troopers with from a half to two Companies of Infantry formed a screen round the Army that was nearly impenetrable to the Russian Cavalry. Sometimes these detachments were provided with artillery. In the mountainous country of the Yalu, the Japanese thus occupied every hill, every pass, every road, and again in the south, in the month of June, they occupied thus thirty-six villages from Pitzevo to Polandian, forming a screen which kept their movements concealed from the Russian Cavalry, and prevented any attempt to gauge their strength."

It was behind such a screen that, on the 14th of June, the Japanese deployed their forces south of Vafangu, and hid completely the turning movement which rolled up the Russian right next day.

Detachments of Cavalry which succeeded in passing these posts found their retreat blocked, and rarely escaped with any information of value from the infantry of the advanced Japanese detachments. On the other hand, some patrols of four or five men succeeded in escaping the vigilance of the enemy, and provided most useful information to the columns. As a result of this system of mixed detachments, the Russian Cavalry, so superior in numbers, in horsemanship, and in horses, never got a chance of using lance or sabre, yet it is safe to say that since the first skirmish, there was never a day that the Russian Cavalry were not in action on foot with the carbine.

General Negrier insists very strongly on this aspect of Cavalry use during the late war, and points out how invariably the action of the Cavalry had to be with the firearm, never with the *arme blanche*.

General Negrier writes :—" We must at once admit that the Russian Cavalry proved bold and active, and if they failed as a result of unsuitable organisation in the duty of procuring information, on the other hand they performed the duty of keeping touch and guarding the Army from surprise movements with great success." By General Negrier's own showing,

this was not always the case, for the movement of the Japanese 4th Division at Telissu was not discovered by the Cavalry, or if it was, the news was not given at all, or given in such a way as to be considered doubtful.

However, General Negrier goes on to instance the handling of Ssamssonoff's Cavalry after the Battle of Telissu as peculiarly interesting. "Briefly," he says, "the situation was as follows:—The great Mandarin Road which leads from Mukden to Port Arthur, 250 miles away, was, with the railway that runs close to it, the main, indeed the only, Russian line of communication. It passes by Nanshan thirty-five miles from Port Arthur, Tehlissu eighty-four miles, Tashichao 145 miles, Haicheng 165 miles, Liauyang 210 miles. The Battle of Nanshan cut off Port Arthur from the Manchurian Army. Kuropatkin rightly desired to abandon Port Arthur to its fate, and concentrate his forces about Tashichao, which is the junction of the Mukden-Pekin, Mukden-Port Arthur Railways, in order to manœuvre between the armies of Oku, advancing north along the railway and main road, and Kuroki, who was advancing from the Yalu on Liaoyang. Reasons still unexplained caused the abandonment of this scheme, and it was decided to attempt the relief of Port Arthur. Kuropatkin, therefore, ordered a large part of his available forces towards Wafangu, and they were there met on the 14th June by General Oku, and on the 15th June completely defeated. After



the battle the Russian force, which formed the I. Siberian Corps, had to retire hastily, at first by two night marches on to Wantselin, then on to Sainontcheu, and thence to Kaiping. General Ssamssonoff, an active, vigorous man of forty-six years of age, regained contact on the 16th June, the morning after the battle. His Cavalry followed the rearguard of one Brigade and covered it by outposts four miles from its main body. On the 19th June his force consisted of two Regiments (six squadrons) of Dragoons, six sotnias of Siberian Cossacks, three sotnias of Frontier Guard troops, a Commando (such is the term used in the report) of mounted Scouts from the 13th Regiment of Siberian "Chasseurs," the 3rd Battery Transbaikal Cossack Horse Artillery.

"The squadrons were from eighty to ninety Sabres strong, the Sotnias ninety to 100. The duty was most arduous, for this Cavalry in action, day and night, could not find time for rest. Ssamssonoff asked for a force of Infantry for night outpost duty; he was told that he must remain between the enemy and the rearguards of the Infantry Columns. On the 20th of June, seven officers' patrols were despatched, and a turning movement by three Battalions and two Batteries was reported. General Ssamssonoff sent off all his baggage, keeping only a few pack animals. The outposts were fighting all through the night. At 2.20 a.m., they mounted again, and slowly withdrew. The Japanese advanced in three columns, the strength of which could not

be exactly determined; their Cavalry remained under the protection of its Infantry; that is to say, the columns continued to cover themselves in march as in camp, by a screen of mixed detachments of Troopers and Infantry, which the Russian patrols could not pierce. Some few officers' patrols obtained information, and also a few Chinese spies brought in news. On the 23rd the withdrawal continued without fighting, except that a Troop hidden in a fold of the ground succeeded in destroying half the horses of a squadron of Japanese Cavalry, which had dismounted to fight on foot. On the 24th, the withdrawal continued as on the 25th and 26th; on the 25th, twelve officers' patrols were sent out, and on the 26th, Prince Jaime de Bourbon led a portion of the I. Siberian Corps on a reconnaissance towards Senoutchen. Three Sotnais marched at 3.30 a.m. to join this force, and a force of three Squadrons of Japanese Cavalry were met with, who retired on Senoutchen, where, according to Chinese spies (the only means of information that could be found) there were twelve Squadrons and 3,000 Japanese Infantry.

"On the 27th Ssamssonoff was ordered to attack Senoutchen. He started at 3.30 a.m., and delivered his attack on foot. His artillery was powerless against the village, and the attack failed. At 9 a.m. he withdrew. On the 28th he withdrew to Baovitai, a point several miles south of Kaiping. There was no further movement till the 6th July. The weather was very bad, yet in spite of fatigue,

and the fearful state of the roads, the Troops retained their morale perfectly. On the 1st, Infantry took up the outposts, and the Cavalry could rest. Thus the cavalry of Ssamssonoff took twenty-three days to give up thirty-five miles, sometimes withdrawing, sometimes advancing a little, always in touch with enemy, and following his movements, but never able to obtain sufficient information on which to base a scheme of operation.

“It was often twenty miles south of the Infantry Columns, and its difficulty was increased by the fact that the commander of the force often fixed the line of its outposts, and even its places of bivouac, although between the time of the transmission and receipt of the orders the situation had often entirely changed.

“Even when the Infantry was close at hand there was no rest for the Troopers, for Ssamssonoff's orders were to keep between the columns and the enemy. Some units were actually seventy-two hours without unsaddling.

“In all these operations the Cavalry could only act as mounted infantry, but as they only had a weak artillery, and were insufficiently trained in musketry, they could not pierce the veil that shrouded the Japanese movements.

“It should be noted here that the Russians formed from each Regiment (a Russian Regiment has four or five Battalions) a squadron of 140 mounted Infantry, mounted on ponies, and as a result were able to dispense with Divisional Cavalry.

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"The Commando, as it was called, formed from the 13th Regiment of Chasseurs (the Regiment itself was in Port Arthur), was singularly valuable. They fought on foot in wide extended lines, and being formed from picked officers and men all good shots, they proved indispensable, and rendered signal services, although their ponies were not up to the class of the regular Cavalry and Cossacks.

"The problem was to obtain information, and Ssamssonoff has placed it on record that the only effectual means was by small patrols led by an officer or exceptionally well-instructed noncommissioned officer, as a rule volunteers.

"Contact was for the most part kept by detachments of about a Troop, which rode through the enemies' outpost lines by night. Chinese spies were much employed."

Of the Japanese system the same authority writes: "How did the Japanese manage with so great an inferiority of Cavalry? From the beginning of the campaign they used for reconnaissance work officers' patrols of one or two officers, and three or four troopers.

"We have seen how they managed their service of security by means of small mixed detachments, generally disposed in echelon, and marching on a broad front. Fighting on horseback was the rarest occurrence, dismounted fire action the rule. The Japanese did not make the mistake of asking their Cavalry to provide information that no Cavalry could

give. Information of this character was obtained by a spy service organised for several years in Manchuria and Korea. The Japanese did not forget the difficulty of improvising such a service at the time of war."

In this connection it is interesting to remember that the Prussian Great General Staff organised a similar spy service in the years preceding the outbreak of war with France, and that the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsular employed spies largely.

At the same time, the difficulty of arranging a spy service in peace times is very great, and is also entirely repugnant to the feelings of the English people, who, speaking generally, use the smallest amount of secret service money of any power. There are three things in which the Cavalry's duty to the army lie—first, keeping contact and obtaining information; secondly, attacking the communications; thirdly, assisting when the forces have joined battle.

We have seen how both sides managed the first duty. There were several examples of the second duty during the War. On the first day of the Battle of Mukden two squadrons of Japanese Cavalry cut the railway far away to the north. The actual cutting of the rail had but little effect, but fear for the communications induced Kuropatkin to send a Brigade of Infantry northwards, and to retain a large body of Cavalry Troops that might have been usefully employed in the line of battle. The right time for the enterprise was taken, that is, just when the battle

was joined, and had therefore some effect. Reference has been made to raids by Mistchenko and Rennenkampf from the west and east flanks of the Russian forces in their lines of the Shaho, in the Japanese communications, and it may be interesting to follow in more detail the course of one of these raids as described by General Negrier. "After the battle of the Shaho, the Russians withdrew on Mukden and took up a defensive line. The Japanese maintained contact, and took up a defensive line, watching. In January, the rivers being frozen, Kuropatkin resolved on a raid on the Japanese communications. For the purpose, a force of 5,000 troopers, provided with Horse Artillery and Engineers, was detailed under General Mistchenko. The force was divided into three columns under Ssamssonoff, Abramhoff, and Tieleschoff. The front covered about five miles. Men and horses were in hard condition, and the weather clear and suitable. By the night of the 9th (after two days' march) the force was about the junction of the Liaoho and Hunho Rivers, seventy miles south of Mukden. The Scouts captured a small convoy and set fire to a house, which was said afterwards to have been previously filled with combustible material, which gave out a great smoke. However this may be, during the night fires broke out from point to point, acting as beacons, and lighted either by Japanese posts or Chinese in the pay of the Japanese, to give warning of the presence of the Russian force. On the morning of the 10th 500

Chungouzes (Chinese brigands said to have been employed as scouts by the Japanese) were encountered and charged by a Regiment of Daghestan Cossacks, who succeeded in killing about 100 and driving the others away in panic. Advancing south, the Russians came upon a village occupied by about 200 Japanese. General Verkhoyudinski's Cossacks succeeded in capturing the village on foot by a night attack. The Brigade of Cossacks of the Caucasus was dispatched to break the railway to the north of Haicheng to prevent the arrival of troops from the south. On the 11th the troops attacked old Nieuchang about mid-day. Sixty Japanese took refuge in a building, and refused to yield. They were left. Several convoys were captured and burnt. The Japanese, or their agents, continued to burn villages in the wake of the Russian columns, whose track was thus marked by pillars of cloud by day and pillars of fire by night.

"The night of the 11th and 14th was passed in some villages eighteen miles east of Yinkou. During this time the Caucasian Cossack Brigade had destroyed 500 yards of railway, and the Dragoons had partially destroyed the bridge at Tashichao, and cut the telegraph. On the 12th, Mistchenko burnt the store-houses near Yinkou, and attacked the station defended by about 1,000 Japanese without artillery but entrenched. The six Russian Horse Artillery Batteries opened fire upon the station, and set some of the buildings on fire, but in spite of the gallantry

of the troops, the attack, continued till nightfall, failed, because, says the report, the Cavalry had no bayonets. General Mistchenko retired, taking his wounded with him. A considerable force had been despatched from Haicheng to cut off the Russians' retreat, but Mistchenko evaded them, and on the 15th was safe behind the Russian outpost line.

Here was a raid organised and conducted with skill and energy, and without tangible result.

"In the present state of European Cavalry, none would have succeeded better."

Such is the dictum of General Negrier, and his explanation is most interesting; he says:

"We cannot put the failure of the enterprise to lack of vigour, but to the fact that the Cavalry lacked the necessary indispensable arm—a howitzer or light mortar, the only thing which can make a village untenable. The thirty-six guns in action at the station of Yinkou, like Ssamssonoff's guns at Senontchen, had no effect. The question is judged. The Cavalry must have a certain number of howitzers, or light mortars, firing a shell of big capacity containing high explosives. Also the Troopers must be armed with the bayonet. Napoleon gave out the following order in his decree of the 12th February, 1812: 'The Musketeers will be armed with a bayonet, with the scabbard attached to the sword belt, as with the Dragoons.'"

There seems to be no doubt that the features of this War, like those of the South African War, have



aroused again the strength of those who argue that Cavalry must look to the firearm entirely as their fighting weapon. This knotty question it is beyond the scope of this work to consider, but it is curious that those who most strenuously advocate the use of the Pompom on account of the moral effect of its fire (its actual effect is negligible) should sometimes be the strongest advocates of the abolition of the *arme blanche*, though, undoubtedly, the moral effect of even a possibility of a charge by Troopers armed with lance or sword is extraordinarily great.

The best thing to consider in connection with the Cavalry, is the use to which Russians put their great force when battle was actually joined. The action of the Cavalry at the battle of Mukden will serve as an example. It will be remembered that, briefly, the course the battle took was that Oyama massed the 3rd and 5th Armies behind his left and right wings. This action was not unnoticed by the Russians. Oyama then attacked by his right, and the Russians reinforced their left with part of their general reserve. Oyama then attacked strongly by his left, and after several days' very hard fighting, destroyed the Russian right army under Kaulbars. The centre and left then fell back. The reports of the losses differ. General Negrier places the Russian loss at 26,500 killed, 90,000 wounded, 40,000 prisoners, and the Japanese at 46,500 killed and wounded. The Russians, therefore, suffered a complete and disastrous defeat with the total loss of one of their armies.

General Negrier states that one may certainly place the indifferent use of the Cavalry among the chief causes of their defeat.

As a matter of fact, it seems certain the Russian headquarters made sure that the Japanese would attack in the mountains. Russian reports show that the Russians firmly believed that the Japanese Army knew themselves to be inferior in the plains. Why they held this extraordinary opinion since the battle of the Shaho it is impossible to say, but it seems certain that it was the case, and this preconceived idea was acted upon with disastrous results.

As far as we can tell from the reports, it was not till the 7th March that Kuropatkin was informed by his Cavalry that the Troops, pressing round his right, were more than strong detachments. Yet Nogi had moved certainly by the 27th February, and Kuropatkin's right wing had been actually dislodged and forced to form a new front on the 4th March.

At the beginning of the action the bulk of the Cavalry was in three groups—one on the east flank, one on the west flank, and one right away to the rear, the rest was frittered away in keeping open communications between the armies, etc. Nogi's Army from Port Arthur (three Active and one Reserve Division) had formed behind the Japanese left, and apparently on the 27th February his advanced echelon, consisting of 6,000 Cavalry, a Battalion of Infantry, and some Artillery, marched north on Sinminting and drove in the Russian

Right Flank Cavalry. Nogi's columns followed in echelon by the left, with the column referred to leading. On the 3rd, Nogi, covered by this column and mixed detachments, was able to form for attack, and on the 4th the Russian right was virtually already defeated.

It appears then that the great force of Russian Cavalry did nothing.

General Negrier points out that, had they been collected in great masses, they could have acted like Sheridan's Cavalry at Five-Forks. An army in the defensive must keep a large Reserve, and what more properly belongs to it than the Cavalry?

Suppose 5,000 to 6,000 had been behind Kaulbars, with a Brigade at Sinminting, 4,000 behind the left and left flank guard, and 8,000 at Mukden. Then Nogi's advance could have been checked by the Cavalry of the Russian right and General Reserve, 13,000 in all, and time given to re-form the Russian right to meet the new situation.

Again, even later, when the Russian Right was already defeated, the Japanese pushed a force of Cavalry and Artillery through the gap between the right of Bilderling (centre) and the left of Kaulbars, and it was this force that accounted for the bulk of the prisoners. A reserve of Cavalry of even 4,000 men could have filled the gap and saved this loss, even if it could not have saved the battle. It is said that the Japanese felt the want of Horse Artillery.

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With regard to the Artillery lesson of the War, it is really not much new to us that has been arrived at.

The all-importance of cover has again been clearly demonstrated. Cover from view is of more value than artificial cover, but the value of indirect shooting is not generally so great as that of direct shooting. There are certain points that have appeared, and of these the most important is that changes of position are wellnigh impossible during the course of a modern battle until the end is near.

That the original position shall be the best one, and that best suited to the tactical requirements, has become an even more important point than before. Both sides used, if possible, to entrench their guns in positions from whence a full view of the field could be obtained over the sights; if, however, time or opportunity did not admit of elaborate preparation, indirect fire from behind natural cover of the ground was always employed.

The Russians, as has been already stated, used the new Q.F. Gun on a long recoil carriage. Long bursts or even short bursts of rapid fire were, however, but seldom employed on account of the weight of ammunition expended. Of course, when a target offered, the "Rafale" was used for a short time, but opportunities apparently seldom offered.

The Japanese gun was out-matched by the Russian, and though the earlier battles were, as in the case of Tehlissu, decided practically by the Japanese Artillery, later the balance turned the other

way, and at Tashichao the invisible Russian guns held the Japanese attack at bay all day. At this battle General Negrier states that three Russian batteries fired 7,402 rounds. One battery (eight guns) fired 4,008 rounds, equal to 501 rounds per piece.

The Russian gun only had shrapnel, the Japanese had high explosive common shell as well. The high explosive shell was found to have very little effect on troops or earthworks, though effective against villages.

It is said that the Japanese would have found use for more heavy guns, and particularly heavy howitzers. The driving of the Russians was, of course, far superior to that of the Japanese, who are said to be poor horsemasters and riders, and no doubt the constant failure of the Japanese Artillery to closely support their successful Infantry was due to want of skill in driving, or of resource among the officers and men in extricating their guns from difficult places, and moving them over difficult country.

The absence of Horse Artillery on the Japanese side was severely felt, or at any rate was noticed by all the military attachés. The Russian Cavalry, however, was so ineffective that the Japanese did not suffer much from the lack of this arm; as, however, they were often apparently barely able to get their field guns along, it is unreasonable to suppose that they would have done much good with Horse Artillery.

The Mountain Artillery of the Japanese did yeoman

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service, and often proved invaluable. The 12th Division, which was armed with this form of Artillery, was invaluable during the Battle of Yalu and the subsequent advance.

The Japanese do not separate their Artillery from the intimate knowledge of the other arms in the way that we do in the English Army, nor indeed does any Continental power. With us the Artillery is considered a scientific arm, and the use of the gun is shrouded in a halo of mystery. It begins from the time when the sappers and gunners are educated as schoolboys in a different military school from the Infantry and Cavalry. Artillery are now, it is true, attached to the Divisions, but the Divisional General has really but little intimate knowledge of his Artillery. Surely this is unsound. There is nothing uncanny or extraordinary about Artillery or its use, and were three Batteries of Artillery (why are they called a Brigade? why not a battalion?) posted to each Brigade of Cavalry or Infantry, and made as much an integral part of that Brigade as the Battalions of Infantry or the Regiments of Cavalry composing it, this severance of the arms would end. A Brigade of Infantry would be commanded either by an infantryman or a field gunner, a Brigade of Cavalry by a cavalryman, or a horse gunner, the problem of what to do with senior Artillery officers would be solved, and the Infantry would look upon the Artillery as an integral part of their own body, not as an outside and somewhat strange force.

The arrangement suggested would, further, do away with the escort difficulty ; a Brigadier would be sure to look after his own guns without application from the officer commanding the Artillery.

The necessity for elaborate signalling arrangements, field telephones, &c., and also for intelligent look-out men provided with telescopes and able to send messages by signal, has been abundantly manifested during the War.

Gun Shields have been described by, I believe, every authority as a vital necessity.

The march of the Japanese columns is thus graphically described in Russian report, dated 21st July, 1904, quoted by Negrier:—"In front of the troops march Chinese spies, who examine the ground with the utmost care, for any failure in reporting results is instant death. For this purpose the Japanese capture a Chinese family, and holding some members as hostages, dispatch the rest as spies—and so on—— . . . Behind the spies come small patrols of Cavalry, accompanied by Infantry. Thus for three or four Troopers there are four or five foot soldiers. When the Cavalry trot, their shadows, the foot soldiers, run behind them. Behind the patrols come the front detachments, followed by small columns at great intervals. Generally the bulk of the Cavalry march behind these advanced guards, and serve as escort to the guns. When a detachment chooses a position, on hearing from the spies that the enemy are near, the advanced guards deploy in long chains in the position.

Then the columns march up and entrench. The work is quickly done, ranges to conspicuous points and to likely places of position for the enemy are accurately found. The whole zone is divided into squares on a plane table sketch, and these plane tables are placed in every trench for officers and men to become acquainted with the positions and distances of principal points. The sappers dig communicating trenches, make roads and put up the telephones, and make signalling stations. Heliographs, fires, smoke, flags, and lamps are used for signalling, &c."

The above description is probably a good one of the wonderful methodicalness, to coin a word, of the Japanese military methods.

The Russians were firmly convinced that every Chinaman was a Japanese spy; as a matter of fact the Russians employed as many Chinamen as they could get in the same capacity.

In the earlier battles the Japanese used the regulation formation of Continental armies. Their losses were severe, and their formation soon began to resemble those in use by us since the Boer War. That is to say, they learnt to "advance slower and take cover." Another Russian report says: "The Japanese make use of the cover afforded by the ground to perfection. During the battle one never sees the movements of their reserve, or even of the firing line . . . . The Japanese use their Reserves to strengthen their firing line . . . . In the actual hand-to-hand attack they endeavour to cover the bayonet



attack of one section by the magazine fire of another . . . .”

A French Military Correspondent thus describes a Japanese Infantry attack on the 31st August in front of Liauyang by a part of Oku's Army :—“ Comfortably installed behind great rocks, we looked out across the plain. Suddenly, on the other side of a dip, a thin yellow line appears. It is Japanese Infantry, who have put their knapsacks on the ground and commence the attack. For this attack the line has been divided in parties of a dozen to a score of men, each under the orders of an officer or non-commissioned officer. Each of these parties has been allotted a point in the enemy's line which it must reach; it is the only order it will receive. The first line leaps from the trenches, the leaders of parties dash to the front, running with all their might up to the nearest shelter which the ground affords, where they throw themselves down flat. Their parties follow without attempting to keep any order, each man's sole thought being to get to the shelter as quickly as possible. I fix my glasses on one of these groups. It first crosses a field of corn without being noticed by the enemy, but now it comes into a field of roots. The yellow dots dash forward. A man falls, gets up, staggers a pace or two, and then falls again. Two others fall beside him, and a fourth, wounded, tries to get back to shelter, but also falls by the other three wounded men. Soon in front of the Russian position appears

the swarm of khaki dots, nearing it by jumps. The men follow the leader, and the leader chooses the cover and the road to it. Often a group will follow another group for a few hundred yards to avail itself of good cover, and then resume its own general position in the alignment. Now all the original symmetry of line is lost, and some of the groups are running, others lying, others crawling or just getting up. Thus the 1,000 yards to the obstacles covering the Russian defences are covered, and here at last the line halts and forms itself under shelter of a bank, stupidly raised by the Russian to cover the obstacles from artillery fire. When the first line was half way to the obstacles, a second line leapt from the trenches, and followed the first in the same way, and then a third. In all, six lines successfully followed the first, and sheltered in the cover of the little bank. Meanwhile volunteers were rushing out by twos and threes to cut the wire of the entanglements. Seldom did these heroes get back unscathed. Now the fire on either side is getting hotter and hotter, and men on both sides are falling fast. But one cannot hear the whistle of the bullets or the rattle and roar of the musketry, for excitement in the drama that is going on about 1,000 yards from where we lie. The whole Japanese line gleams with the fringe of steel of the bayonets. It is the last phase. Once more the officers spring out from the friendly cover with a shout of "Banzai," taken up by the whole force. They move forward with difficulty, but yet

surely, in spite of the barbed wire, and the *trous de loup*, and the merciless fire. Whole parties are wiped out, they are replaced by others; the flood abates momentarily, but always advances. Then the long grey line of Siberian Riflemen gets up in its turn and doubles down the reverse slope of the mountain, while covering forces of the Russians pour a hail of bullets on the pursuing Japanese." The form of attack thus graphically described resembles that now in force in our own Army most closely. Our Army is recently experienced in war against a people armed with modern weapons of precision, and has very little to learn in actual minor tactics from this War. Probably as far as a technical training of the lower ranks goes, no Army in the world is the equal of our own. The all-importance of musketry to the Infantry man had been recognised by the British Army before any Continental Army, and there is no doubt that though the shooting of our troops left much to be desired in 1899, it was in a class above that of any foreign Army.

Our Artillery has always been the best in Europe; and though our Cavalry, owing to training difficulties, was not perhaps so efficiently trained in reconnaissance work as Cavalry officers wish, yet the average of horsemanship was, and is, higher than that of other powers. The importance of visual signalling had been for years understood in the British Army. What, then, have we to learn? There are two points of technical training which this War has brought into

more prominence than the South African. The first is the necessity for the use of the spade in the *Attack* as well as the defence ; the second is the necessity to practise night attacks, or rather approaches to a position during the night, as well as night marches. There are many other instructive things about this War, and any reader of this brief account will deduce lessons for himself ; but among the most important things which one notices that hardly come under the head of technical training, are the difficulty of supplying Q.F. guns with ammunition in a battle of several days' duration ; the fact that battles are of several days' duration, and that the men must go into action prepared for this ; that so large are the bodies of Troops collected in sometimes small areas, and often for days, while a great combination is preparing, that billets cannot be found, and therefore some sort of shelter tent is a necessity ; and lastly, that the lines, whether defensive or offensive, taken up are so long that visual signalling is not sufficient, and some system of field telephones must be devised. But above all the lessons of the War, one stands out pre-eminently ; it is, " Be Ready." The nation that has a military Policy thought out and calculated with mathematical accuracy by a highly trained general staff, working on scientific lines, is bound to have the advantage over another even slightly less prepared. The gallantry and high technical skill of its troops will not avail. It would be interesting to know how many officers were employed at Tokio to

work out plans for the War with Russia during the years between the Chino-Japanese War and 1904. How many officers do we employ in this purely strategical work? Yet the Japanese could only have to fight in one direction, while our world empire may call upon us to fight in a dozen different countries. Is there a definite Plan of Campaign for every contingency such as the great German General Staff has prepared? This is the question for the British peoples to ask of their political leaders.

## STRENGTH OF FORCES.

TABLE I.

## RUSSIA.

	Bat.	Squ.	Baty.	Round Numbers.	
Active Troops in Far East.	92	35	31 (?)	95,500	
Reinforcements detailed for mobilization.	32	—	17	34,000	(Most of these troops had not arrived at the time of the Battle of the Yalu.)
Reserves East of the Lake Baikal.	23	40	2	29,000	
Total ...	147	75	50	158,500	(Besides 4 Boundary watch Brig- ades, 30,000, raised to from 42,000 to 45,000 on mobilisation and detailed as Railway guards.)
Reserves for- warded during course of year, but part of which would not arrive till spring of 1905.					
Total ...	328	116	127	368,000	
Grand Total	475	191	177	526,500	(Besides special troops, 1 bat- talion Sap- pers to each Army Corps.)

TABLE I. (*continued*).

## JAPAN.

	Bat.	Squ.	Baty.	Round Numbers.
Guard	12	3	6	14,000
1st—6th, 8th—12th Inf. Div.	132	33	66	154,000
7th Inf. Div.	12	3	9	14,000
1st and 2nd Cav. Brig.		16		2,400
1st and 2nd Field Art. Brig.			36	7,200
	156	55	117	191,600

According to regulations there were 13 Reserve Infantry Brigades of 6 Battalions, 1 Squadron, 1 Battery. The Reserve troops, however, were made much stronger, and made into Divisions of 8 Battalions, and, besides, 32 other Battalions were raised.

Behind this was a Landsturm of 104 Battalions (130,000 men).

N.B.—Russian Batteries, 8 guns old pattern,  
6 guns new Q.-F. pattern.

Japanese Batteries 6 guns.

TABLE II.  
RUSSIA.—DISTRIBUTION AND ORGANISATION AT TIME OF BATTLE OF MUKDEN.  
Commander-in-Chief—General of Infantry, Kuropatkin.  
Chief of the Staff—Ssachoroff (Lieut-General).

2nd Army. General Grippenber. C. of S., Lieut-General Rupki.	3rd Army. General Kaulbars. C. of S., Lieut-General Martson.	1st Army. General Linievitch. C. of S., Lieut-General Charkevitch.	Port Arthur. Lieut-General Stoessel. C. of S., Major-General Rosnatonski.
16th, 10th, 8th Army Corps. 5th Siberian Army Corps. 2 Cavalry Regiments. 4 Sapper Battalions. 4 Machine Gun Com- panies.	1st, 17th Army Corps. 6th Siberian Army Corps. 2 Cavalry Regiments. 3 Sapper Battalions. 2 Brigades of Cavalry.	1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Siber- ian Army Corps. 5 Cavalry Regiments. 5 Machine Gun Com- panies. 4 Sapper Battalions. 2½ Divisions of Cavalry. A Brigade of Siberian Defence Troops.	27 Battalions. 3 Fortress Artillery Battalions. 1 Battalion and 1 Com- pany Sappers. 1 Torpedo Company. 1 Telegraph Company. 7 Field Batteries. 2 Heavy Batteries.
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th Defence Brigades. 2½ Cavalry Divisions. In March, 1905, still in transit, 4th Army Corps.			

Coast Defence under General of Cavalry Chreschtschatzki :  
One Army Corps less one Division.  
5 Regiments Cavalry.

Lines of Communication Troops :  
Railway Troops, 9 Battalions.  
Boundary Watch, 50,000 men.  
Reserve Troops, 13 Battalions.  
4½ Regiments Cavalry.



TABLE II.—(Continued.)  
JAPAN.—ORGANISATION AND DISTRIBUTION.  
Commander-in-Chief—Marshal Oyama.  
Chief of Staff—General Kodama.

At time of standstill in operations, October to December, 1904.

Siege of Port Arthur.	Field Army.		
	1st Army.	2nd Army.	4th Army.
3rd Army.			
General Nogi.	General Kuroki.	General Oku.	General Nodzu.
1st, 7th, 9th, 11th Division One Reserve Division. Siege Train.	Guards, 2nd, 12th Division. One Reserve Division. 2nd Cavalry Brigade. 2nd Field Artillery Brigade.	3rd, 4th, 6th Division. 1st Cavalry Brigade. 1st Field Artillery Brigade.	5th and 10th Divisions. One Reserve Division.
General Reserve.—8th Division One Reserve Division.			

N.B.—Each Field Artillery Brigade had 18 or 20 4.5-inch Howitzers.

TABLE II.—(Continued.)  
ORGANISATION OF JAPANESE ARMY AT TIME OF BATTLE OF MUKDEN.

1st Army.	2nd Army.	3rd Army.	4th Army.	5th Army.
Kuroki.	Oku.	Nogi.	Nodzu.	Kawamura.
Guards, 2nd, 12th Divisions. Brigades of Cavalry and Field Artillery.	3rd, 4th, 6th. One Reserve Division. Brigades of Cavalry and Field Artillery.	7th, 9th, 1st. One Regiment Artillery.	5th, 10th. One Reserve Division. One Regiment Artillery.	11th Division. Three Reserve Divisions.

GENERAL RESERVE.

8th Division. 2 Reserve Divisions.

Total, 13 Active, 7 Reserve Divisions, 3 Brigades Artillery, 2 Brigades Cavalry.

Total, 310,000 men about.

## TABLE III.

Russian Forces.—The Theatre of War at the time of  
the Proclamation of Peace.

Commander-in-Chief—Linievitch.

Chief-of-Staff—Charkevitch.

1st Army. Kuropatkin.

Chief-of-Staff—Ewert.

I. European Army Corps.

I., II., III., IV. Siberian Army Corps.

Primorski Regiment of Dragoons.

71st Infantry Division.

One Pontoon Battalion.

One Balloon Section.

Two Cavalry Divisions under Rennenkampf  
(Siberian Cossack Division and Transbaikal Cossack  
Division).

2nd Army. Kaulbars.

Chief-of-Staff—Russki.

I. Rifle Army Corps.

VIII., X., XVI. European Army Corps.

VI. Siberian Army Corps.

1st Orenburg Cossack Regiment.

One Pontoon Battalion.

One Balloon Section.

## Cavalry under Mistchenko :—

Caucasian Mounted Brigade.  
 Caucasian Cossack Division.  
 Ural Transbaikal Cossack Division.  
 Orenburg Cossack Division.  
 Don Cossack Division.

## 3rd Army.

Batianoff.

Chief-of-Staff—Martianoff.

II. Rifle Army Corps.  
 IV., XVII. European Army Corps.  
 V. Siberian Army Corps.  
 One Pontoon Battalion.  
 One Balloon Section.  
 Two Regiments of Dragoons.

## Vladivostok Defence.

Kreshtshatiski.

Chief-of-Staff—Rutkovski.

2nd, 8th, 10th, East Siberian Rifle Division.  
 Three Regiments of Cossacks.

## Garrisons at Vladivostok.

Six Artillery Battalions.

One Sapper	}	Company.
Two Mining		
One Balloon		

Garrisons at Nicolaievsk.

One Infantry Regiment.

One Artillery Company.

One Mining Company.

Garrisons at Possiet Bay.

One Infantry Regiment.

One Artillery Company.

One Mining Company.

Lines of Communication Troops.

Three-and-a-half Regiments of Cossacks.

50,000 Boundary Watch Troops.

Eight Railway Battalions.

A number of Supply Companies.

Three Cossack Battalions of Foot.

Besides the above troops there were mobilised and in process of transportation to the seat of war—

IV., XIX. European Army Corps.

In process of mobilisation—

XXI. and XXIII. European Army Corps.

N.B.—There was also a siege train at the front, and also the 53rd Infantry Division, but it is not known to whom they were attached.

A Russian Army Corps consists of two Divisions each of two Brigades of two Regiments of four Battalions of four Companies.

Each Division has also an Artillery Brigade of six Battalions of six guns each.

This works out at—

Battalion	...	850
Regiment	...	3,400
Infantry Brigade		6,800
Division	...	13,600 Infantry.
		1,200 Artillery.
		Total 14,800.

Total of Army Corps, nearly 30,000.

As a matter of fact, none of the units, from the Company upwards, were ever up to strength, and the Army Corps fell sometimes as low as 28,000 Infantry.

The Cavalry Divisions were also much below strength, and a great many Cavalry were wasted in doing duty with the Divisions of Infantry.

